Right-Making Characteristics and Morally Right Acts

Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst (1990)
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Abstract

An appealing ethical view is that there are a number of different characteristics that make acts obligatory and others that make acts wrong. Being an instance of promise-keeping makes an act obligatory, while being an instance of causing harm makes an act wrong. Another appealing view is that we can do what we are obligated to do. Accepting both of these views poses well-known problems. Imagine that a person makes two incompatible promises. Either the person is not obliged to keep each promise, or the person cannot satisfy both obligations. One of these appealing views must be rejected or modified. ;W. D. Ross offered a theory with a modification of the first view as its centerpiece. He introduced the term "prima facie duty" to describe the moral status of acts having a characteristic such as being an instance of promise keeping. He claimed that a person having mutually exclusive prima facie duties can be morally obligated to satisfy at most one of them, the other being "overridden." Ross did not, however, make clear what is involved in one prima facie duty overriding others, or the relationship between prima facie duties and moral obligation. ;I am sympathetic to Ross's approach, but realize that it needs closer examination. I begin by stating his view as carefully as possible and laying out the problems with it. Various attempts have been made to explicate the relationship between prima facie duties and moral obligation. These range from arguing that principles expressing prima facie duties are analogous to physical laws with ceteris paribus caveats to defining both concepts by use of a third normative concept such as requirement. I examine some of these attempts and find them flawed. I conclude that it is a mistake to suppose that there is some principle expressing the relationship between prima facie duties and moral obligation. I argue that the difficulties with Ross's view can be traced to Aristotelian elements in it. These elements cause Ross's theory to be an unfortunate mix of two approaches to ethics: an investigation of the ethical life and an investigation of ethical concepts

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References found in this work

Moral dilemmas and consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.
Values and the heart's command.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):5-19.
Moral realism and moral dilemma.Philippa Foot - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (7):379-398.
The Logic of Conditional Obligation.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1972 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (3/4):417.

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