Abstract

I explore Ross's pluralistic answer to his theoretical question, what makes right acts right? This requires developing several contexts. Moral philosophy begins with practical doubts in three ways, but ethical theory can resolve only the two of them which create doubts about the authority of moral rules. Primarily, moral philosophy should be pursued in a purely theoretical spirit. Ross's ethics involves a synthesis of Aristotle and Kant, using Kant's view to "correct" Aristotle. This leads Ross to distinguish between the external and internal aspects of acts, claiming that acts can be evaluated according to their fittingness and independently of actions . This becomes fully worked out through his analysis of the rightness of acts and the moral goodness of actions. ;Ross's view is intuitionistic in three ways which have their roots in Sidgwick's methods of ethics. Critical analysis of Ross's basic distinction between act and action shows that it comes to require almost endless refinements, partly due to his acceptance of the Kantian saying that "ought implies can" coupled with his determinism. This creates confusion about the fundamental distinction on which much of Ross's theory depends. Analysis of the necessary conditions of judgments about duties leads to my claims that moral judgments are judgments about types of actions and that the possibility of being mistaken in our moral judgments implies objective criteria. ;Ross's answer to the theoretical question is his pluralistic theory of prima facie duties. I go beyond Ross's terse treatment and show, contrary to his claims, that at least one prima facie duty rests on insight into its truth, and not on empirical facts or definite circumstances. I have also explored why Ross thinks his theory is better than the "simpler" theories of Moore and especially Kant. The answer is shown to depend on the casuistry of conflicts of duties. My critical analysis of Ross concludes that his theory involves an absurd moral imperialism and it does not preclude the view that there can be a more fundamental moral principle involved in the foundation of duty