Abstract

The formation of the moral point of view in Bernard Williams’ work might be understood as taking place between two central concepts: the individual and the community. It is through the tension between these two poles that some form of knowledge is acquired. In Williams’ work, the individual virtue takes the name of authenticity, and the communitarian knowledge is, importantly, ethical confidence. A philosophical peer of Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, has dealt with the same question, although in very different ways. They are usually taken to be philosophical rivals in many respects, especially regarding their political views, their views on religion and their thoughts on Aristotle. But if we look deeper into their claims, we should discover that not only do they have similar ethical concerns, as their responses to those concerns are not, in essence, as different as they seem. My purpose with this paper, however, is not to deny the important differences between the two philosophers, but rather to make conspicuous Williams’ demanding ideas on the formation of the moral point of view by (1) connecting significant portions of his work and (2) contrasting his ideas with that of a philosophical “rival,” namely by interpreting MacIntyre’s own declarations on Williams’ work. It will stand out that both philosophers’ motivation to do ethics is to grant an equilibrium between the individual conscience and the moral knowledge that is acquired within a community.