Philosophy of Science:1-41 (forthcoming)

Authors
Dunja Šešelja
Eindhoven University of Technology
Will Fleisher
Northeastern University
Abstract
Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry.
Keywords Collective Epistemic Responsibility  Epistemic Harm  Epistemic Responsibility  Duty to Join Forces  Norms of Inquiry
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1017/psa.2022.9
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The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1983 - University of Notre Dame Press.

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