Folk psychological concepts: Causation

Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):205-213 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Which factors influence the folk application of the concept of causation? Knobe has argued that causal judgments are primarily influenced by the moral valence of the behavior under consideration. Whereas Driver has pointed out that the data Knobe relies on can also be used to support the claim that it is the atypicality of the agent's behavior that influences our willingness to assign causality to that agent. While Knobe and Fraser have provided a further study to address the cogency of this alternative explanation, we argue that they have not provided a complete analysis. We present a variation on this study that addresses the relation between atypical and moral considerations as they contribute to the application of the concept causation. Our results indicate that atypicality cannot be ignored in an analysis of the folk concept of causation. That is, Knobe and Fraser's response to Driver is inadequate.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.
Folk Psychology and Folk Morality: Response to Critics.Joshua Knobe - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):270-279.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
131 (#137,167)

6 months
6 (#510,232)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jill N. Cumby
York University

References found in this work

Causation in the Law.F. S. McNeilly - 1959 - Philosophy 37 (139):83-84.

Add more references