Abstract

A consensus has recently emerged concerning the role of values in scientific inquiry. The idea that science is value-laden has been elaborated by writers as diverse as Kuhn, McMullin, Hempel, Putnam, Laudan, Feyerabend, Scriven, and Graham.1 Although they all agree that values, value judgment, and evaluation play an important role in science, their emphases and their arguments are different. In fact, I believe that enough work has been done, and enough issues have been raised, that it is becoming increasingly useful and instructive to discuss and explore further the main issues that divide this group of thinkers.One of these issues is whether it is advisable to treat as a value any type of controversial position, such as belief in God or the thesis of metaphysical materialism; some writers do this, but it is questionable whether it is useful to mix together such disparate items.2.