A Logic for Disjunctive Ignorance

Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6):1293-1312 (2021)
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In this paper, we introduce a notion of ‘disjunctive ignorance’, which is a weak combination of two forms of ignorance in the literature. We propose a logical language with ‘disjunctive ignorance’ as a sole modality, explore the logical properties of this notion and its related notions, and axiomatize it over various frame classes. By finding suitable reduction axioms, we extend the results to the case of public announcements and apply it to Moore-like sentences.



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Citations of this work

A Logical Modeling of Severe Ignorance.Stefano Bonzio, Vincenzo Fano & Pierluigi Graziani - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (4):1053-1080.
Epistemic logic.Vincent Hendricks - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Axiomatizing Rumsfeld Ignorance.Jie Fan - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (1):79-97.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..

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