Abstract

The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that all the major tenets of Kant's theory of Transcendental Idealism may be deduced entirely from his argument in the Metaphysical Expositions--and that these tenets do not, therefore, depend for their plausibility on reference to the nature of mathematical knowledge, to the Antinomies or to the existence of incongruent counterparts. Kant's arguments in the Metaphysical Expositions are not interpreted as attempts to prove that space and time are a priori intuitions. Instead, it is argued that these passages ought to be read as attempts to prove that out concepts of space and time can only be accounted for on the supposition that they represent the form of intuition. Very strong accounts of Kant's arguments in the Metaphysical Expositions are possible when they are read as directed towards this goal. The theory of space and time that can then be derived from the Expositions is adequate both to evade Trendelenburg's charge that Kant neglected an alternative and to provide a foundation for a non-phenomenalistic reading of Kant's claim that space and time are subjective forms of sensitivity