Abstract

Arguing against Jaeger's contention that in his Academy days Aristotle was content to defer to the ontology of Plato, in particular the Theory of Forms, while at the same time developing the logic of the Categories which is at odds with the Theory, Owen shows that the formulation of the logical doctrine presupposed a criticism and rejection of the Platonic ontology; the more general point Owen makes is that logic and ontology were never distinct in Aristotle's mind, and his development in both areas can be understood only through an appreciation of their interdependence in his intellectual Odyssey. Platonism there is in Aristotle, but it is most fruitfully traced in Aristotle's thought as a function of Aristotle's early rejection of another distinctive Platonic theme, i.e., Plato's conviction that Dialectic was a master science, and subsequent return to this theme in his later work where he installs metaphysics in the chair of first philosophy. That this return to Platonism represents an advance over Plato is due to the fact that it is conversion mediated through Aristotle's doctrine of equivocals.—E. A. R.