Reason, Egoism, and the Prisoners' Dilemma

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):169 - 177 (1980)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay I shall try to show that the egoist's inability to avoid the Prisoners’ Dilemma is not a reason for rejecting egoism. In the first section I shall outline the Prisoners’ Dilemma and indicate why the egoist cannot avoid the dilemma. In the next section I shall consider an argument against egoism based upon an appeal to our intuitions as to what is rational. And in the final section I shall consider the argument that egoism is not self-supporting and so is not an adequate conception of rationality.But first a few words should be said about what is meant by egoism here. The egoist is commonly thought of as someone who acts from selfinterest. This is in keeping with the present use of the term as long as ‘self-interest’ is not understood in a too narrow a fashion. Perhaps a Jess misleading way of characterizing the egoist, though, is as someone who tries to maximize his happiness - i.e., he is an individual utility maximizer.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Broad on psychological egoism.W. D. Glasgow - 1978 - Ethics 88 (4):361-368.
Ethical Egoism as a Moral Theory.Michael Chau-Fong Mok - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Why Rational Egoism Is Not Consistent.John Marshall - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (4):713 - 737.
Toward a Truer Understanding of Ethical Egoism.Dina Schein Garmong - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
How Not to Refute Ethical Egoism.L. Burkholder - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):653 - 657.
Cooperating with cooperators.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (1):23 - 55.
How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):39-67.
How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):39-67.
Nagelian arguments against egoism.Stuart Rachels - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):191 – 208.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
48 (#340,667)

6 months
4 (#863,607)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reason and Maximization.David Gauthier - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):411 - 433.

Add more references