The Purpose of a Normative Account of the Content of our Beliefs

In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and Meaning: Essays at the Interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften. pp. 6--183 (2002)
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Michael Esfeld
University of Lausanne

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