Abstract

Gerhard Ernst tries to clarify the nature of rationality. He does this by distinguishing two fundamentally different kinds of rationality: rationality in the “adjustment-sense” and rationality in the “evaluation-sense.” A person is rational in the adjustment-sense if her mental states are well adjusted to each other, i.e. if her beliefs, emotions and intentions fit together (in a sense Ernst explains); a person is rational in the evaluation-sense if she has evaluative beliefs which are adequate on the basis of her non-evaluative beliefs. Our “rational response system,” as Ernst calls it, is concerned with keeping our mind unified by adjusting our mental states to each other and with evaluating what we believe. On the basis of the distinction between rationality in the adjustment-sense and rationality in the evaluation-sense one can understand what is right about the view that rationality consists in responding adequately to reasons and what is right about the view that rationality consists in being consistent (broadly understood).