Mind and Society 13 (2):227-245 (2014)

Authors
Abstract
This paper examines the adequacy of an evolutionary-oriented notion of rationality—ecological rationality—that has recently been proposed in economics. Ecological rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, and in this sense is a version of what philosophers call ‘practical rationality’. Indeed, the question of the adequacy of ecological rationality as it is understood in the paper, is the question of whether ecological rationality is a genuine notion of practical rationality. The paper first explicates and motivates the notion of ecological rationality by explicating the notion of practical rationality, grounding ecological rationality in an evolutionary approach to the emotions which is mainly illustrated by the example of fear, and outlining the reasons adduced in economics for generalizing ecological rationality beyond the emotions. The paper then argues that the raison d’être of practical rationality is first and foremost a specific role it plays in the explanation of behavior, or in telling why it has occurred. Finally, based on –, the paper argues that ecological rationality lacks a constitutive feature of practical rationality—namely, normativity—which is related to the latter’s basic explanatory role, and thus cannot be considered a genuine notion of practical rationality. While the paper focuses on the economic version of ecological rationality, its conclusions apply just as well to other, related, versions of the ecological notion that have been proposed in biology and evolutionary psychology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11299-014-0151-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,163
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

View all 53 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Complexity and Individual Psychology.Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (2):203-219.
The Challenge of Fear to Economics.Mario A. Cedrini & Marco Novarese - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (1):99-106.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Utility Maximization Generalized.Paul Weirich - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2):282-299.
Risk and Tradeoffs.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.
The Role of Emotions in Ecological and Practical Rationality.Matteo Mameli - 2004 - In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 159--178.
Utility and Framing.Paul Weirich - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):83 - 103.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-10-23

Total views
27 ( #423,291 of 2,507,015 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,155 of 2,507,015 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes