Abstract

This dissertation examines a controversy in contemporary ethical theory between proponents of deontological and utilitarian moral approaches, and advocates of communitarian or care accounts. The "Theory-Antitheory," debate, is thought to center upon the role of principles in moral masoning. "Theories" are said to differ from "antitheories," insofar as the former are thought to rely upon clearly articulated, universally binding rules, while the latter are said to guide moral decisions in the absence of governing principles. I argue that this reading fails to adequately represent the differences between competing moral accounts. I contend that this debate is best understood by examining the conception of the moral self presupposed by the approach in question. ;My method of inquiry in takes the following form: after presenting a literature review, I examine the moral self in two impartialist accounts---the deontological approach of John Rawls, and the utilitarian theory of R. M. Hare. I show that each theory depends upon a moral agent who is capable of deciding and acting from an isolated, impartial perspective. Yet I show that neither approach is capable of separating the agents, moral judgments from her own interests and preferences. ;I then examine the moral self presupposed by care ethics. This approach depends upon an agent who is inherently connected to and responsible for others, who is capable of judging and acting according to the particulars of the given situation. While I contend that the ethics of care is in many ways superior to impartialist accounts, the conception of the self offered by this theory is also problematic. Because the caring agent cannot conceive of herself apart from her network of relations, she has no basis on, which to choose her own projects or assess the goals of her community. ;I conclude my study by examining the existentialist ethic of Simone de Beauvoir, which differs dramatically from impartialist and contextualist accounts. Beauvoir's agent is strongly individualistic yet the goals of this agent depend upon interaction with others. I argue that Beauvoir's conception of the self provides the most adequate basis for a moral theory.