Abstract

In various occasions Michel Foucault argues that Descartes’ philosophy represents a crucial turning-point in the history of the relationship between the self and the truth in Western thought. Before Descartes, argues Foucault, the self’s search for truth takes an “ascetic” form and aims at a profound transformation that is expected to affect the general mode of existence of the subject. However, says Foucault, no such profound change is required in Descartes’ project, since the acquirement of reliable evidence is considered to be sufficient for the attainment of truth. Pierre Hadot on the other hand criticizes this argument by reminding that Descartes’ Meditations is full of the echoes of the ancient tradition of “spiritual exercises” and, for this reason it may be conceived as an ascetic project. In this paper, we will make a close study of this disagreement, especially by situating Foucault’s argument into the broader context of one of his central problematics: the rise in Western culture of the notion of “evidence” as the dominant criterion of truth. To this end, we will read Foucault’s argument under the light shed by his analysis of two different regimes of truth, one - related to asceticism - based on the “effective power” of utterances and practices and the other - centered on the notion of evidence - based on the epistemic content of statements.