Platon über den Wert der Wahrnehmung.

This paper discusses passages in Plato’s Phaedo which seem to contradict each other: at Phaedo 65a-d and at 66e-67a Plato seems to rule out that sense perception can be of any help in the acquisition of knowledge, whereas at Phaedo 74b-75a it is claimed that we get our knowledge of (the form of) equality only via the perception of equal things. I argue that the incompatibility of these passages is only apparent since in the first group of texts (all taken from Socrates’ so-called apology) Socrates is made to represent the ‚true philosophers‘ (probably the Pythagoreans), whereas in the latter passages (from the recollection argument) he speaks in propria persona. I then discuss the question why Plato did insert in his dialogue a position which he does not share, and I finally argue that Plato did not believe in the recollection of the form of equality.