Oxford University Press UK (2012)
AbstractThe standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
Intuitions in Philosophy: Overview and Taxonomy
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (Centrality) is widely accepted both in philosophical methodology or metaphilosophy and philosophy at large. This introductory chapter provides an overview and taxonomy of views about what intuitions are and w... see more
A Big Mistake: Experimental Philosophy
Experimental philosophers are right in thinking that if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence, then we should attempt to find out whether philosophers’ intuitions are reliable, widely shared and subject to biases. It has, however, already been shown that philosophers do not in fact r... see more
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Citations of this work
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