Why does duress undermine consent?1

Noûs 55 (2):317-333 (2019)
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Abstract

In this essay, I discuss why consent is invalidated by duress that involves attaching penalties to someone's refusal to give consent. At the heart of my explanation is the Complaint Principle. This principle specifies that consent is defeasibly invalid when the consent results from someone conditionally imposing a penalty on the consent‐giver's refusal to give the consent, such that the consent‐giver has a legitimate complaint against this imposition focused on how it is affects their incentives for consenting. The Complaint Principle says that this consent is defeasibly invalid to make room for the Authorization Principle, which allows sincere authorizations to constitute valid consent, even when these are issued by an agent acting under duress. The Authorization Principle has application only in cases of third‐party duress because when the consent‐receiver is the source of the duress, the consent‐giver is not sincerely authorizing the action.

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Author's Profile

Tom Dougherty
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding.Tom Dougherty - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (2):119-150.
Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future.Tom Dougherty - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):441-461.
Contrastive Consent and Third Party Coercion.David Enoch - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1).
Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion.Maximilian Kiener - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4):361-389.

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References found in this work

Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The methods of ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press. Edited by Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones.
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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