Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485 (2006)

Authors
Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-2006-010
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.
Assertion is Weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
Endorsement and Assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.

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