Epistemic Infinitism, the Reason-Giving Game, and the Regress Skeptic

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):81-102 (2020)
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Epistemic infinitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justification of a given proposition requires an infinite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infinitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justification on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infinitism appear as well-equipped to silence the regress skeptic is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic.



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Erhan Demircioglu
Koc University

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