Abstract

This dissertation is a collection of three papers, “Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough,” “Absence of evidence against belief as credence one,” and “Suspending belief in credal accounts.” The role of suspension—the agnostic’s attitude that sits between belief and disbelief—is central in each paper. The first paper demonstrates that though mere undermining of the evolutionary debunker is a tempting response to their argument, it requires suspension on a premise. That is incoherent with belief in the other premise and disbelief in the conclusion. Therefore, mere undermining does not make believing we have moral knowledge epistemically permissible. The second paper demonstrates that Jane Friedman’s objection to an account of suspension as credence between 0 and 1 relies on equivocation or a false premise. Friedman’s objection entails that suspension on p is rationally permissible while one is maximally confident that not-p. I argue that these two attitudes are incoherent and so her objection fails. The third paper demonstrates that suspension should not be thought of as a credence of any kind whether precise or imprecise. Unique problems are associated with every possible credal account of suspension. This means that a traditional picture of belief, suspension, and disbelief cannot be reduced to a credal picture. Suspension is either fundamental or should be eliminated.