How to be an imprecise impermissivist

Abstract

Rational credence should be coherent in the sense that your attitudes should not leave you open to a sure loss. Rational credence should be such that you can learn when confronted with relevant evidence. Rational credence should not be sensitive to irrelevant differences in the presentation of the epistemic situation. We explore the extent to which orthodox probabilistic approaches to rational credence can satisfy these three desiderata and find them wanting. We demonstrate that an imprecise probability approach does better. Along the way we shall demonstrate that the problem of “belief inertia” is not an issue for a large class of IP credences, and provide a solution to van Fraassen’s box factory puzzle.

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2022-05-27

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Seamus Bradley
London School of Economics (PhD)

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