Minds and Machines 3 (3):319-333 (1993)

Michael Bratman''s restricted two-tier approach to rationalizing the stability of intentions contrasts with an alternative view of planning, for which all of the following claims are made: (a) it shares with Bratman''s restricted two-tier approach the virtue of reducing the magnitude of Smart''s problem; (2) it, rather than the unrestricted two-tier approach, is what is argued for in McClennen (1990); (3) there does not appear to be anything in the central analysis that Bratman has provided of plans and intentions (both in his book,Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, and in the article Planning and the Stability of Intention) that precludes his adopting this alternative approach; and (4) it is an approach that neither requires nor encourages any distinction between the standards appropriate to artificial and to human intelligence.
Keywords Plans  intentions  coordination  resolute-choice
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DOI 10.1007/BF00976285
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Ulysses and the Sirens.Jon Elster - 1986 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):82-95.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rational Resolve.Richard Holton - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):507-535.
Pragmatic Rationality and Rules.Edward F. Mcclennen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):210-258.
Intention Inertia and the Plasticity of Planning.Piotr Makowski - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1045-1056.

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Similar books and articles

Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
On the Principle of Intention Agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.
Narrative and the Stability of Intention.Edward S. Hinchman - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):111-140.
Intention Rationality.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
Planning and the Stability of Intention.MichaelE Bratman - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.


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