Praxiology meets Planning Theory of Intention. Kotarbiński and Bratman on Plans

In Piotr Makowski, Mateusz Bonecki & Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy (eds.), Praxiology and the Reasons for Action. New Brunswick, (U.S.A.): Transaction Publishers. pp. 43-71 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Planning organizes our actions and conditions our effective-ness. To understand this philosophical hint better, the author investigates and juxtaposes two important accounts in action theory. He discusses the concept of a plan proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his praxiology (theory of efcient action), and the so called “planning theory of intention” by Michael E. Bratman. The conceptual meeting of these two proposals helps to remove aws in Kotarbiński’s action theory, it also shows the way, in which we can enrich the idea of plans in the frame-work of intentions. Generally, praxiology occurs to be still an important perspective in action theory, which particularly shows how we can improve our understanding of planning when confronted with infuentialcontemporary accounts.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-08-14

Downloads
97 (#182,928)

6 months
917 (#1,165)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Piotr Makowski
University of Warsaw

Citations of this work

Reasons for Being Flexible. Desires, Intentions, and Plans.Piotr T. Makowski - 2016 - In Timo Airaksinen (ed.), Desire: The Concept and its Practical Context. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 59-78.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Structures of agency: essays.Michael Bratman - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.

View all 18 references / Add more references