Abstract

My study constitutes a new view of Peirce's conceptions of both the scientific method and truth. I attempt to show that both conceptions are grounded on what I call 'Tychist Logic.' It is a logic that is composed of the set of evolving laws ruling the universe and our minds in such a way that both and, consequently, the scientific method, are self-corrective. ;I claim that Peirce defended two interrelated conceptions of truth, which he calls Universal and Human Truth in which the second is the evolutionary outcome of the first. In both definitions of human truth, it is conceived as a special kind of correspondence that is to be finally understood as a relationship between signs. The scientific method is the criterion of truth, although only in the long run will it be possible to determine whether scientific statements are actually true. For the time being, man can only ascertain the probability of statements. ;Peirce distinguished between ontic and epistemic probability. Statements using ontic probability are about facts as Peirce viewed them in his evolution from nominalism to realism. Epistemic probability, on the other hand, is related to Peirce's theory of arguments and is his central thesis of confirmation and falsificationism. ;It is my view that Peirce defended a sort of indeterministic realism according to which reality is governed by statistical laws allowing the emergence of chance and novelty. ;Finally, my reply to Laudan's, Rescher's and Habermas' criticisms of Peirce's views on method, truth, and realism, emphatically shows that those views are neither reducible nor similar to any brand of XXth Century empiricism