Abstract

This thesis is a critical examination of Peirce's defense of the scientific method of inquiry. It is argued that Peirce presented an empirical defense of the scientific method which cannot be properly understood in isolation from his metaphysics. This interpretation of Peirce's thought is shown to answer a number of critical objections commonly raised against his theory of knowledge. Further, Peirce's view is shown to anticipate and, in some respects, improve upon recent coherentist efforts in epistemology. Nevertheless, Peirce's defense of science is found to be inadequate due to problems in his theory of quantitative induction. ;On the interpretation of Peirce's thought presented in this thesis, he is seen as adopting a methodological approach to the problem of the epistemic justification of empirical knowledge. He argues for the cognitive superiority of science over other methods of inquiry, contending that science alone is self-corrective. It is argued that, on Peirce's view, the adoption of the scientific method is validated by means of an appeal to his scientific metaphysics. The metaphysics is defended by means of an appeal to the results of the application of the scientific method. The methodological and metaphysical hypotheses employed by Peirce in his defense of science are seen by him as being mutually supportive and as confirmed by the success and results of inquiry. His defense of science is thus shown to have the form of a legitimate circulus fructuosus. Further, Peirce is shown to have anticipated, in certain significant respects, the recent coherentist defense of science presented by Nicholas Rescher. It is argued that Rescher's criticisms of Peirce's defense of science rest on a misinterpretation of his thought. ;However, Peirce's defense of science is found to be inadequate. Problems in this theory of quantitative induction are shown to undermine his account of science as self-corrective and his case for the adoption of the scientific method of inquiry