Whitehead's Criticism of Hume: An Element in the Background of Whitehead's Subjectivism

Dissertation, Boston University (1995)
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Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to emphasize objectivism as a fundamental tendency in Whitehead's philosophy, especially in his understanding and adoption of the Cartesian tradition of subjectivism. I have chosen to discuss Whitehead's criticism of Hume because I think it shows the fundamental position of Whitehead as regards the Cartesian subjectivist tradition. An examination of Whitehead's criticism of Hume will show in what sense Whitehead thought that the subjectivist philosophy must be balanced by objectivism and how this balancing affected Whitehead's philosophy in general. ;Objectivism generally means that nature causes the mind to originate and to grow; while subjectivism generally means that subjects enjoying their own consciousness are the ultimate philosophical data. Whitehead's philosophy will be described as a successful--in steering clear of dualism--combination of subjectivism and objectivism. ;This dissertation defends the following theses: that Whitehead looked at his own philosophy and Hume's as placed in the Cartesian subjectivist tradition but as developed in opposite directions respectively ; that Cartesian subjectivism itself includes a strong objectivist implication, which, however, remains implicit because of its intellectualism ; that though Hume's empirical way of thinking reveals his objectivist convictions, these convictions come to be dominated by the influence of the Cartesian philosophy he has adopted ; that Whitehead considered Hume's subjectivism as sensationalism, which eventually excludes nature from any serious discussion of causation ; that objectivism is a fundamental scheme in which Whitehead has put his theory of physical causality and theory of interpretation and judgment . Until we reach Chapter 4, the Whiteheadian perspective will be restricted as much as possible; until we reach Chapter 5, Whitehead's technical terms will also be avoided as much as possible.

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