Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant

In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI Publications (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,672

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.Martin Davies - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 321-363.
First-Person Externalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Modern Schoolman 84 (2/3):155-170.
Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
33 (#482,049)

6 months
1 (#1,462,504)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Transmission Failure Explained.Martin Smith - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.
Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references