Deconstructing prejudice: A Levinasian alternative

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):72-83 (1994)
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Abstract

Presents an alternative to the traditional explanations of prejudice. Prejudice, according to E. Levinas , becomes a possibility of pre-judgment, but only after one takes account of the moral obligation one has to others with whom one shares the world. Consistent with Levinas, it is proposed that the traditional problems of prejudice occur only when a person or group of people refuse to find definition of their humanity in the face of others with whom they share the world. Thus, to build a conceptual framework, psychologists need to elucidate those ways in which people define and articulate their own humanity by responding to others in light of the moral obligation they have to others. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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