Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume’s Skepticism and Naturalism Concerning Knowledge and Causation by Graciela De Pierris [Book Review]

Journal of the History of Philosophy 54 (4):678-680 (2016)
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Abstract

De Pierris offers a reading that unites radical skepticism and normative naturalism as “two equally important and mutually complementary aspects of Hume’s philosophical position”. The “modern theory of ideas” shapes skepticism, and Newtonian methodology is the basis for naturalism. The “modern theory of ideas” holds that evidence for optimal human cognition is grounded in the “immediate acquaintance with ostensive presentations that are or have been given to the mind”. This is the “presentational-phenomenological model of apprehension”. Descartes introduces to the model pure intellectual items, that is, clear and distinct ideas, which have “‘immutable and eternal’ essences or forms” as referents...

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Angela M. Coventry
Portland State University

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