Abstract

This dissertation investigates the role of beauty in the moral philosophies of Hume and Kant. It interprets Hume's thought by showing how he applies "beauty" to conduct and character as well as nature and art; how his "critique" of philosophical reason informs his view of morality; and how his approach compares and contrasts to that of Kant. ;Chapter one examines Hume's concept of "general rules," concluding that philosophy involves reflecting upon ordinary life and formulating "principles" to explain it. This clarifies the aim of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste." Chapter two employs this argument to show that in his moral philosophy Hume conceives "moral beauty" by analogy with natural and artistic beauty. As in his aesthetics, he approaches moral life by discovering principles which explain conduct. This makes his thought "descriptive" rather than "normative." ;Chapter three responds to the charge that Hume "recommends" one sort of conduct over another. By investigating reflection and character, it argues that these "normative" elements are not recommendations of an "ethical" sort, but part of Hume's philosophical explanandum. This conclusion is central to chapter four which compares "Of the Standard of Taste" with Kant's "Antinomy of Taste," and his notion of "sentiment" with Kant's concept of "feeling." Although points of agreement emerge, the two thinkers are seen to have different views of philosophy and the role it plays in human life. This is reflected in the regulative role Kant assigns to reason, the task he delegates to moral philosophy, and his contention that beauty is a "symbol" of the good. ;Chapter five examines Hume's specific contribution to moral philosophy by articulating three objections to his approach, viz., that he fails to explain, first, the existence of moral imperfection; second, why moral judgments are universally valid; and, third, how "general standards" can be reconciled with cultural diversity and moral improvement. Concentrating on taste and education, subjectivism and relativism, and a "progress of sentiments," respectively, a Humean response to each objection is articulated. The study concludes with a consideration of Hume's "critique" of philosophy and emphasizes his suggestion that philosophical inquiry is itself a matter of "taste."