Abstract

In Différence et répétition, Gilles Deleuze struggles against the imprisonment of representation: identity, analogy, opposition and similarity. In order to do so, Deleuze finds in Duns Scotus a first step towards the liberation of philosophy. In fact, one of the most distinctive philosophical positions of the franciscan author is the refusal of the analogy of being. Through it, Deleuze claims that Scotus is the first author to create a non-hierarchical distribution of sense. However, Deleuze considers that Scotus didn’t bring these liberation to its fulfilment by not eliminating divine transcendence. Only Nietzsche would do it through eternal recurrence. In this essay, we intend to: see how Deleuze interprets Scotus’ univocity thesis [2]; expose the theoretical implications of univocity of being against analogy [3]; examine Deleuze’s critiques and establish the relation between Scotus’ univocity of being and Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence [4]. Finally, the goal of this discussion is to hypothesize, against Deleuze, a reevaluation of transcendence by claiming that it does not need to be attached to negation, analogy and hamartiocentrism, as it is not in Duns Scotus.