The Formalities of Temporaryism without Presentness

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 61 (2):181-202 (2020)
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Abstract

Temporaryism—the view that not always everything always exists—comes in two main versions: presentism and expansionism (aka the growing block theory of time). Both versions of the view are commonly formulated using the notion of being present, which we, among others, find problematic. Expansionism is also sometimes accused of requiring extraordinary conceptual tools for its formulation. In this paper, we put forward systematic characterizations of presentism and expansionism which involve neither the notion of being present nor unfamiliar conceptual tools. These characterizations are full-blown logics, each logic comprising an axiomatic proof system and an intuitive semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete.

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Author Profiles

Sven Rosenkranz
Universitat de Barcelona
Fabrice Correia
University of Geneva

References found in this work

Past, Present and Future.Arthur N. Prior - 1967 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.
Presentism.David Ingram & Jonathan Tallant - 2022 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Truth and the Past.Michael Dummett - 2003 - Columbia University Press.
How do we know it is now now?David Braddon-Mitchell - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):199–203.

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