Two Arguments for Impossiblism and Why It isn’t Impossible to Refute them

Philosophia 45 (2):569-584 (2017)
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Abstract

This paper examines two arguments against the possibility of moral responsibility—the first directly from the work of Galen Strawson and the next inspired by Strawson’s argument. Both of these arguments are found wanting, and their shortcomings are used as a springboard to sketch a positive libertarian view of moral responsibility and defend that view against preliminary objections.

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10.1007/s11406-017-9847-7

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Joseph Corabi
Saint Joseph's College of Indiana

Citations of this work

Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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