Ositivism, Cerebralism And Voluntarism In William James

Minerva 10:1-27 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

James’s positivism is different from Comte’s, Clifford’s, and the logical positivists’. Notably, itpresupposes a difference between natural–scientific inquiries and the metaphysical inquiry he callsradical empiricism. Equally importantly, the positivism of James’s great book, The Principles ofPsychology, studies the cerebral conditions of the will. This cerebralism is necessary background forunderstanding James’s voluntarism, the will–to–believe doctrine that came later. James’s positivismgoes hand–in–hand with his value pluralism; they are responsible for different domains of inquiry,natural-scientific and ethical, respectively. It is a mistake to impose a “master moral syllogism” ontothe former, implying that all facts are constituted by the will as guided by a utilitarian moral principle.Cerebral shaping of the will occurs not only through the “front door” of experience, especially in theformation of habit, but also through the “back stairs” of mutation and natural selection, which createsbrains suited to different pursuits. The brain is no tabula rasa

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

William James.Max Carl Otto (ed.) - 1942 - Madison,: The University of Wisconsin Press.
William James, l'attitude empiriste (William James, the empiricist stance) (review).Mathias Girel - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (3):503-508.
William James’s Pluralism.Michael R. Slater - 2011 - Review of Metaphysics 65 (1):63-90.
Experience, Reason, and the Virtues: On William James's Reinstatement of the Vague.Jacob L. Goodson - 2010 - American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 31 (3):243-258.
William James.Graham Bird - 1986 - New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-22

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references