Why artificial intelligence needs sociology of knowledge: parts I and II

AI and Society:1-15 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Recent developments in artificial intelligence based on neural nets—deep learning and large language models which together I refer to as NEWAI—have resulted in startling improvements in language handling and the potential to keep up with changing human knowledge by learning from the internet. Nevertheless, examples such as ChatGPT, which is a ‘large language model’, have proved to have no moral compass: they answer queries with fabrications with the same fluency as they provide facts. I try to explain why this is, basing the argument on the sociology of knowledge, particularly social studies of science, notably ‘studies of expertise and experience’ and the ‘fractal model’ of society. Learning from the internet is not the same as socialisation: NEWAI has no primary socialisation such as provides the foundations of human moral understanding. Instead, large language models are retrospectively socialised by human intervention in an attempt to align them with societally accepted ethics. Perhaps, as technology advances, large language models could come to understand speech and recognise objects sufficiently well to acquire the equivalent of primary socialisation. In the meantime, we must be vigilant about who is socialising them and be aware of the danger of their socialising us to align with them rather than vice-versa, an eventuality that would lead to the further erosion of the distinction between the true and the false giving further support to populism and fascism.

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Knowledge and Social Imagery.David Bloor - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):195-199.
What Computers Can't Do.H. Dreyfus - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):177-185.
Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge.David Bloor - 1984 - Human Studies 7 (3):375-386.
Interactional expertise as a third kind of knowledge.Harry Collins - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):125-143.
Experiments with interactional expertise.Harry Collins, Rob Evans, Rodrigo Ribeiro & Martin Hall - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4):656-674.

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