A growing body of research can be found in which roboticists are designing for reciprocity as a key construct for successful human–robot interaction (HRI). Given the centrality of reciprocity as a component for our moral lives (for moral development and maintaining the just society), this paper confronts the possibility of what things would look like if the benchmark to achieve perceived reciprocity were accomplished. Through an analysis of the value of reciprocity from the care ethics tradition the richness of reciprocity (...) as an inherent value is revealed: on the micro-level, as mutual care for immediate care givers, and on the macro-level, as foundational for a just society. Taking this understanding of reciprocity into consideration, it becomes clear that HRI cannot achieve this bidirectional value of reciprocity; a robot must deceive users into believing it is capable of reciprocating to humans or is deserving of reciprocation from humans. Moreover, on the macro-level, designing social robots for reciprocity threatens the ability and willingness to reciprocate to human care workers across society. Because of these concerns, I suggest re-thinking the goals of reciprocity in social robotics. Designing for reciprocity in social robotics should be dedicated to the design of robots to enhance the ability to mutually care for those that provide us with care, as opposed to designing for reciprocity between human and robot. (shrink)

Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: (...) can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research. (shrink)

The revolution of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly generative AI, and its implications for human–robot interaction (HRI) opened up the debate on crucial regulatory, business, societal, and ethical considerations. This paper explores essential issues from the anthropomorphic perspective, examining the complex interplay between humans and AI models in societal and corporate contexts. We provided a comprehensive review of existing literature on HRI, with a special emphasis on the impact of generative models such as ChatGPT. The scientometric study posits that due to (...) their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior, generative AIs like ChatGPT will continue to grow in popularity in pair with human rational empathy, tendency for personification and their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior. As they blur the boundaries between humans and robots, these models introduce fresh moral and philosophical dilemmas. Our research aims to extrapolate key trends and unique factors in HRI and to elucidate the technical aspects of generative AI that enhance its effectiveness in this field compared to traditional rule-based AI systems. We further discuss the challenges and limitations of applying generative AI in HRI, providing a future research agenda for AI optimization in diverse applications, including education, entertainment, and healthcare. (shrink)

The social and cultural causes behind the widespread use and acceptance of robots in Japan are not yet completely understood. This study compares humans and robots in images gathered through Google searches in Japanese and in English. Numerous pictures obtained by the search in Japanese were found to have a human and a robot looking together at something else (“third item”), whereas many of the images acquired by search in English show a human and a robot facing each other. This (...) is similar to the composition of mother and child in paintings: in _ukiyo-e_ that was painted mainly in the Edo period of Japan, the mother and child are often depicted together viewing something other than themselves, whereas this is not the case in Western paintings of mother and child. It has also been pointed out that, in modern Western paintings, the world inside the picture is separated from the outside world, forming an independent microcosmos, whereas the inside and outside are continuous in Japanese paintings. These may indicate that, in Japanese society, robots are to a certain extent regarded as fellow human beings who can share the third item. In Western society, on the other hand, no code is embedded that can fix robots’ superiority or inferiority to humans, which would easily trigger an antagonistic view toward artificial intelligence (AI)/robots as threatening entities, as shown in most of Western literature and movies. We suggest that such cultural characteristics of Japanese society can contribute to enhance coexistence with AI/robots. (shrink)

The guide dog robot (GDR) is a low-speed companion robot that serves visually impaired people and is used to guide blind people to walk steadily, carrying a variety of intelligent technologies and needing to have the ability to guide with optimal energy consumption in specific scenarios. This paper proposes an innovative technique for virtual-real collaborative path planning and navigation of the GDR specific indoor scenarios, and designs an experimental method for virtual-real collaborative path planning of the GDR specific scenarios. The (...) energy consumption integral equation is used to solve for the energy consumption of the GDR with virtual-real synergy, and the difference in energy consumption is compared for three different navigation directions: horizontal, vertical and oblique obstacle avoidance. The results show that the optimized GDR saves 6.91% in rectilinear movement and 10.60% in curved movement. The efficiency of planning and navigating the GDR in specific domestic scenarios is verified by a virtual-real cooperative. The realization of optimal path planning for energy consumption is instrumental in exploring many of the most significant thought in the path planning and navigation of mobile robots in indoor specific scenarios. (shrink)

A growing number of consumer technology companies are aiming to convince older people that humanoid robots make helpful tools to support aging-in-place. As hybrid devices, socially assistive robots (SARs) are situated between health monitoring tools, familiar digital assistants, security aids, and more advanced AI-powered devices. Consequently, they implicate older people’s privacy in complex ways. Such devices are marketed to perform functions common to smart speakers (e.g., Amazon Echo) and smart home platforms (e.g., Google Home), while other functions are more specific (...) to older people, including health and safety monitoring and serving as companions to mitigate loneliness. Privacy is a key value central to debates about the ethics of using SARs in aged care, yet there has been very little interchange between these debates and the robust theoretical discussion in the legal literature about the future of privacy and AI governance. Drawing on two qualitative studies of older people’s views on consumer SARs, the paper contributes novel findings about older people’s thinking on privacy and data governance at the intersection of their experiences with present day digital technologies and projections for future AI systems, and places their views in dialogue with debates about the future of privacy protection and AI governance. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence and robots may progressively take a more and more prominent place in our daily environment. Interestingly, in the study of how humans perceive these artificial entities, science has mainly taken an anthropocentric perspective (i.e., how distant from humans are these agents). Considering people’s fears and expectations from robots and artificial intelligence, they tend to be simultaneously afraid and allured to them, much as they would be to the conceptualisations related to the divine entities (e.g., gods). In two experiments, (...) we investigated the proximity of representation between artificial entities (i.e., artificial intelligence and robots), divine entities and natural entities (i.e., humans and other animals) at both an explicit (Study 1) and an implicit level (Study 2). In the first study, participants evaluated these entities explicitly on positive and negative attitudes. Hierarchical clustering analysis showed that participants’ representation of artificial intelligence, robots and divine entities were similar, while the representation of humans tended to be associated with that of animals. In the second study, participants carried out a word/non-word decision task including religious semantic-related words and neutral words after the presentation of a masked prime referring to divine entities, artificial entities and natural entities (or a control prime). Results showed that after divine and artificial entity primes, participants were faster to identify religious words as words compared to neutral words arguing for a semantic activation. We conclude that people make sense of the new entities by relying on already familiar entities and in the case of artificial intelligence and robots, people appear to draw parallels to divine entities. (shrink)

With the development of increasingly sophisticated sociable robots, robot-human relationships are being transformed. Not only can sociable robots furnish emotional support and companionship for humans, humans can also form relationships with robots that they value highly. It is natural to ask, do robots that stand in close relationships with us have any moral standing over and above their purely instrumental value as means to human ends. We might ask our question this way, ‘Are there ways we can act towards robots (...) that would be wrong to the robot?’ To address this, Part I lays out standard approaches to moral standing: appealing to intrinsic properties, human responses, and values inhering in relationships. Part II explores the third, relational strategy in detail. Looking beyond Western analyses, it considers Eastern philosophy and the environmental philosophy of 'deep ecology' and extends these approaches to sociable robots. Part III examines practical implications for the case of Samantha, a sex robot that was allegedly raped. Part IV identifies and replies to objections. (shrink)

When the social relevance of robotic applications is addressed today, the use of assistive technology in care settings is almost always the first example. So-called care robots are presented as a solution to the nursing crisis, despite doubts about their technological readiness and the lack of concrete usage scenarios in everyday nursing practice. We inquire into this interconnection of social robotics and care. We show how both are made available for each other in three arenas: innovation policy, care organization, and (...) robotic engineering. First, we analyze the discursive “logics” of care robotics within European innovation policy, second, we disclose how care robotics is encountering a historically grown conflict within health care organization, and third we show how care scenarios are being used in robotic engineering. From this diagnosis, we derive a threefold critique of robotics in healthcare, which calls attention to the politics, historicity, and social situatedness of care robotics in elderly care. (shrink)

Although social robots are achieving increasing prominence as companions and carers, their status as partners in an interactive relationship with humans remains unclear. The present paper explores this issue, first, by considering why social robots cannot truly qualify as “Thous”, that is, as surrogate human partners, as they are often assumed to be, and then by briefly considering why it will not do to construe them as mere machines, slaves, or pets, as others have contended. Having concluded that none of (...) these familiar designations does justice to social robots’ still evolving and yet-to-be-defined status, I go on to consider whether engaging in a “relational turn” which prioritises the relationship over the entities in relation, can provide a more satisfactory alternative. In defending this stance, Damiano and Dumouchel contend that in addition to foregrounding the possibility that social robots constitute new types of artificial companions which we can find “companionable in different ways”, the relational turn has the added advantage of providing a more expansive and productive ethical framework for future research and development in this domain. But on balance, it is far from clear that this approach can circumvent the so-called “dummy-human” problem, the contention that social robots are little more than sophisticated toys with the potential to deceive their users about the prospects for genuine partnership and bonding. Accordingly, I conclude that while Damiano and Dumouchel’s shift in “target phenomenology” brings to the fore facets of the interaction that may be difficult to infer by focussing on the relata alone, it is ultimately too “thin” to qualify as a template for robust human-robotic interaction of the sort that could qualify as a genuine partnership. Hence, while their relational turn has its merits in alerting us to the novel possibilities and challenges afforded by this ever-evolving technology and to the limitations of existing frameworks, it is contended that in itself it cannot provide an adequate template for conceptualising what a genuine human–robot partnership might entail. Instead, we need a more expansive approach that can do greater justice to the complexities of human-robotic interaction in its continuities as well as differences from more familiar human prototypes. (shrink)

In this philosophical exploration, we investigate the concept of robotic moral environment interaction. The common view understands moral interaction to occur between agents endowed with ethical and interactive capacities. However, recent developments in moral philosophy argue that moral interaction also occurs in relation to the environment. Here conditions and situations of the environment contribute to human moral cognition and the formation of our moral experiences. Based on this philosophical position, we imagine robots interacting as moral environments—a novel conceptualization of human–robot (...) moral interaction with an inherent capacity for moral augmentation. To explicate this idea, we first define moral environments as moral systems providing moral affordances. We then intuit and explicate two constitutive conditions of moral environments: the environment’s moral ambiance and its moral atmosphere and compare them with real-life cases of moral environments—the moral landmarks. Based on these explications, we construct several explanatory cases to illustrate robots interacting as moral environments. Lastly, we set to evaluate the ethical challenges and wider social ramifications of using moral environment robots in the public space. (shrink)

The import of computational learning theories and techniques on the ethics of human-robot interaction is explored in the context of recent developments of personal robotics. An epistemological reflection enables one to isolate a variety of background hypotheses that are needed to achieve successful learning from experience in autonomous personal robots. The conjectural character of these background hypotheses brings out theoretical and practical limitations in our ability to predict and control the behaviour of learning robots in their interactions with humans. Responsibility (...) ascription problems, which concern damages caused by learning robot actions, are analyzed in the light of these epistemic limitations. Finally, a broad framework is outlined for ethically motivated scientific inquiries, which aim at improving our capability to understand, anticipate, and selectively cope with harmful errors by learning robots. (shrink)

Ex-Machina and Morgan, two recent science-fiction films that deal with the creation of humanoids, also explored the relationship between artificial intelligence, spatiality and the lingering question mark regarding artificial consciousness. In both narratives, the creators of the humanoids have tried to mimic human consciousness as closely as possible, which has resulted in the imprisonment of the humanoids due to proprietary concerns in Ex-Machina and due to the violent behavior of the humanoid in Morgan. This article addresses the dilemma of whether (...) or not the humanoids in both films possess high levels of artificial consciousness and its possible consequences regarding focalization, a narrative term that presupposes subjectivity, as well as offer two new categories of posthuman focalization—X-focalization and A-focalization. The issue of captivity also has far-reaching ethical implications when considering the underlying assumption of artificial consciousness—if humanoids are indeed endowed with a subjective inner life, then they are entitled to be treated as moral agents, equivalent to humans rather than animals. (shrink)

Robots that can communicate with people are one of the goals reached by the technology developed for automation in work life. Experts aim to improve the communication skills of these robots further in the near future. Besides, various studies emphasize that people may interact with robots in a similar way as they interact with other people. In line of this idea, this study examines the possible causal chain in which the social anxiety affects the robot anxiety which in turn affects (...) the attitude toward interacting with robots. Data obtained from university students were analyzed in a simple and parallel mediation model. The results showed that robot anxiety and in particular two of its sub-dimensions mediate the relationship between social anxiety and negative attitudes toward interaction with robots. Researchers should carry out new studies about the common structural characteristics of the anxiety felt by people due to interacting with humans and robots. (shrink)

Cultural influences are pervasive throughout human behaviour, and as human–robot interactions become more common, roboticists are increasingly focusing attention on how to build robots that are culturally competent and culturally sustainable. The current treatment of culture in robotics, however, is largely limited to the definition of culture as national culture. This is problematic for three reasons: it ignores subcultures, it loses specificity and hides the nuances in cultures, and it excludes refugees and stateless persons. We propose to shift the focus (...) of cultural robotics to redefine culture as an emergent phenomenon. We make use of three research programmes in the social and cognitive sciences to justify this definition. Consequently, cultural behaviour cannot be explicitly programmed into a robot, rather, a robot must be designed with the capability to participate in the interactions that lead to the arising of cultural behaviour. In the final part of the paper, we explore which capacities and abilities are the most salient for a robot to do this. (shrink)

This article aims to present the problem of the impact of artificial intelligence on respect for human dignity in the sphere of care for people who, for various reasons, are described as particularly vulnerable, especially seniors and people with various disabilities. In recent years, various initiatives and works have been undertaken on the European scene to define the directions in which the development and use of artificial intelligence should go. According to the human-centric approach, artificial intelligence should be developed, used (...) and monitored with people in mind, their needs and rights. It is artificial intelligence that should adapt to the rules set by people, not the other way around. The source of all human rights and freedoms is respect for human dignity. This is evidenced by numerous European, international, national regulations and documents. Respecting this value is also one of the works on the AI development. One of the areas of our life into which AI enters more and more boldly and which in the near future, due to demographic reasons and aging population, may be almost dominated by modern technologies, is the medical and care system. The usefulness of industrial co-robots made us think about the possibility of using similar devices in the non-industrial sphere, including in the sphere of care, nursing and therapy. Actually, despite the impressive development of technology and AI, intelligent robots/devices used for care, nursing or therapy (so-called care/nursing or therapy robots) perform rather simple activities. They provide information, navigate, bring something and give it (e.g. medicines, food), help to get up. They are an important support for medical staff in this respect. Performing tasks that are more complex in terms of technology and movement, such as feeding, washing, intimate hygiene, dressing or undressing, is still beyond the reach of the currently used robots. The question we must ask ourselves is whether, in the future, care robots will be able to perform such tasks, and should they do so? Will this lead to the replacement of human medical personnel in the performance of the above-mentioned activities with such robots. Would anyone want to be "looked after" by a soulless machine? Should potential wards/patients, in other words all of us in fact, have the right to object to being taken into the care of an intelligent robot? There is no doubt that intelligent robots have great potential, especially when it comes to ensuring or maintaining the independence or mobility of people with various health limitations. However, we must not forget about the risks and dangers they may generate. Even a simple robot generates serious legal and ethical problems. Who should be liable for damage caused in connection with improper care performed with the participation of a robot? Robots based on AI systems are able to collect a significant amount of sensitive data, for example through the face and speech recognition function. There is considerable scope for abuse in this area, not only in terms of personal data protection but also in terms of informational self-determination, privacy and dignity. Bearing in mind the above risks, the creation of a new right to object to being looked after by a robot should be considered. (shrink)

This article defends two claims. First, humans could be in relationships characterised by hate with some robots. Second, it matters that humans could hate robots, as this hate could wrong the robots (by leaving them at risk of mistreatment, exploitation, etc.). In defending this second claim, I will thus be accepting that morally considerable robots either currently exist, or will exist in the near future, and so it can matter (morally speaking) how we treat these robots. The arguments presented in (...) this article make an important original contribution to the robo-philosophy literature, and particularly the literature on human–robot relationships (which typically only consider positive relationship types, e.g., love, friendship, etc.). Additionally, as explained at the end of the article, my discussions of robot hate could also have notable consequences for the emerging robot rights movement. Specifically, I argue that understanding human–robot relationships characterised by hate could actually help theorists argue for the rights of robots. (shrink)

Bill Joy’s deep pessimism is now famous. Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, his defense of that pessimism, has been read by, it seems, everyone—and many of these readers, apparently, have been converted to the dark side, or rather more accurately, to the future-is-dark side. Fortunately (for us; unfortunately for Joy), the defense, at least the part of it that pertains to AI and robotics, fails. Ours may be a dark future, but we cannot know that on the basis of (...) Joy’s reasoning. On the other hand, we ought to fear a good deal more than fear itself: we ought to fear not robots, but what some of us may do with robots. (shrink)

Mobility robots may soon be among us, triggering a need for safety regulation. Robot safety regulation, however, remains underexplored, with only a few articles analyzing what regulatory approaches could be feasible. This article offers an account of the available regulatory strategies and attempts to theorize the effects of simulation-based safety regulation. The article first discusses the distinctive features of mobility robots as regulatory targets and argues that emergent behavior constitutes the key regulatory concern in designing robot safety regulation regimes. In (...) contrast to many accounts, the article posits that emergent behavior dynamics do not arise from robot autonomy, learning capability, or code unexplainability. Instead, they emerge from the complexity of robot technological constitutions coupled with near-infinite environmental variability and non-linear performance dynamics of the machine learning components. Second, the article reviews rules-based and performance-based regulation and argues that both will fail adequately constrain emergent robot behaviors. The article claims that controlling mobility robots requires a simulation-based regulatory approach. Simulation-based regulation is a novelty with significant theoretical and practical implications. The article argues that the approach signifies a radical break in regulatory forms of knowledge and temporalities. Simulations enact virtual futures to create a new regulatory knowledge type. Practically, the novel safety knowledge type may destabilize the existing conceptual space of safety politics and liability allocation patterns. (shrink)

AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems (AIS) are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from the (...) public and private organisations. The purpose of this article is to offer a mapping of the technological architectures that support AIS, under the specific focus of the moral agency. Through a literature research and reflection process, the following areas are covered: a brief introduction and review of the literature on the topic of moral agency; an analysis using the BDI logic model (Bratman 1987); an elemental review of artificial ‘reasoning’ architectures in AIS; the influence of the data input and the data quality; AI systems’ positioning in decision support and decision making scenarios; and finally, some conclusions are offered about regarding the potential loss of moral control by humans due to AIS. This article contributes to the field of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence by providing a discussion for developers and researchers to understand how and under what circumstances the ‘human subject’ may, totally or partially, lose moral control and ownership over AI technologies. The topic is relevant because AIS often are not single machines but complex networks of machines that feed information and decisions into each other and to human operators. The detailed traceability of input-process-output at each node of the network is essential for it to remain within the field of moral agency. Moral agency is then at the basis of our system of legal responsibility, and social approval is unlikely to be obtained for entrusting important functions to complex systems under which no moral agency can be identified. (shrink)

Learning is a central component of human life and essential for personal development. Therefore, utilizing new technologies in the learning context and exploring their combined potential are considered essential to support self-directed learning in a digital age. A learning environment can be expanded by various technical and content-related aspects. Gamification in the form of elements from video games offers a potential concept to support the learning process. This can be supplemented by technology-supported learning. While the use of tablets is already (...) widespread in the learning context, the integration of a social robot can provide new perspectives on the learning process. However, simply adding new technologies such as social robots or gamification to existing systems may not automatically result in a better learning environment. In the present study, game elements as well as a social robot were integrated separately and conjointly into a learning environment for basic Spanish skills, with a follow-up on retained knowledge. This allowed us to investigate the respective and combined effects of both expansions on motivation, engagement and learning effect. This approach should provide insights into the integration of both additions in an adult learning context. We found that the additions of game elements and the robot did not significantly improve learning, engagement or motivation. Based on these results and a literature review, we outline relevant factors for meaningful integration of gamification and social robots in learning environments in adult learning. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, ethical challenges related to robotics technologies have gained increasing interest among different research and non-academic communities, in particular through the field of roboethics. While the reasons to address roboethics are clear, why not to engage with ethics needs to be better understood. This paper focuses on a limited or lacking engagement with ethics that takes place within some parts of the robotics community and its implications for the conceptualisation of the human being. The underlying assumption (...) is that the term ‘ethical’ essentially means ‘human’. Thus, this paper discusses a working hypothesis according to which by avoiding to engage with roboethics, roboticists contribute to the tacit dehumanisation process emerging in and outside of robotics. An alternative approach includes ‘lived ethics’ which involves not only incorporating formal ethical approaches into the roboticists’ work but also ‘being’ ethical and actually engaging with ethical reflection and practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to explore the acceptance of social robots as companions. Understanding what affects the acceptance of humanoid companions may give society tools that will help people overcome loneliness throughout pandemics, such as COVID-19 and beyond. Based on regulatory focus theory, it is proposed that there is a relationship between goal-directed motivation and acceptance of robots as companions. The theory of regulatory focus posits that goal-directed behavior is regulated by two motivational systems—promotion and prevention. People with (...) a promotion focus are concerned about accomplishments, are sensitive to the presence and absence of positive outcomes (gains/non-gains), and have a strategic preference for eager means of goal-pursuit. People with a prevention focus are concerned about security and safety, are sensitive to the absence and presence of negative outcomes (non-losses/losses), and have a strategic preference for vigilant means. Two studies support the notion of a relationship between acceptance of robots as companions and regulatory focus. In Study 1, chronic promotion focus was associated with acceptance of robots, and this association was mediated by loneliness. The weaker the promotion focus, the stronger was the sense of loneliness, and thus the higher was the acceptance of the robots. In Study 2, a situationally induced regulatory focus moderated the association between acceptance of robots and COVID-19 perceived severity. The higher the perceived severity of the disease, the higher was the willingness to accept the robots, and the effect was stronger for an induced prevention (vs. promotion) focus. Models of acceptance of robots are presented. Implications for well-being are discussed. (shrink)

This paper proposes that existing computational modeling research programs may be combined into platforms for the information of public policy. The main idea is that computational models at select levels of organization may be integrated in natural terms describing biological cognition, thereby normalizing a platform for predictive simulations able to account for both human and environmental costs associated with different action plans and institutional arrangements over short and long time spans while minimizing computational requirements. Building from established research programs, the (...) proposal aims to take advantage of current momentum in the direction of the integration of the cognitive with social and natural sciences, reduce start-up costs and increase speed of development. These are all important upshots given rising unease over the potential for AI and related technologies to shape the world going forward. (shrink)

While philosophers have been debating for decades on whether different entities—including severely disabled human beings, embryos, animals, objects of nature, and even works of art—can legitimately be considered as having moral status, this question has gained a new dimension in the wake of artificial intelligence (AI). One of the more imminent concerns in the context of AI is that of the moral rights and status of social robots, such as robotic caregivers and artificial companions, that are built to interact with (...) human beings. In recent years, some approaches to moral consideration have been proposed that would include social robots as proper objects of moral concern, even though it seems unlikely that these machines are conscious beings. In the present paper, I argue against these approaches by advocating the “consciousness criterion,” which proposes phenomenal consciousness as a necessary condition for accrediting moral status. First, I explain why it is generally supposed that consciousness underlies the morally relevant properties (such as sentience) and then, I respond to some of the common objections against this view. Then, I examine three inclusive alternative approaches to moral consideration that could accommodate social robots and point out why they are ultimately implausible. Finally, I conclude that social robots should not be regarded as proper objects of moral concern unless and until they become capable of having conscious experience. While that does not entail that they should be excluded from our moral reasoning and decision-making altogether, it does suggest that humans do not owe direct moral duties to them. (shrink)

Informed by scholarship in dance studies, this essay examines the popular phenomenon of the dancing robot. It begins with an analysis of social robotics experiments that use techniques of contemporary experimental theater to frame human–robot interactions. With elements of theater history in mind, it becomes evident that such experimental designs fruitfully destabilize common understandings of social robots, theatrical performance, and dance movement. This sets up a discussion of a co-creative approach to developing robot choreography which utilizes compositional techniques from experimental (...) dance to, among other things, avoid cultural appropriation. Taken together, these points show that, because dance movement is culturally laden, scholarship in dance studies should be considered when designing dancing robots. (shrink)

People meeting a robot for the first time do not know what it is capable of and therefore how to interact with it—what actions to produce, and how to produce them. Despite social robotics’ long-standing interest in the effects of robots’ appearance and conduct on users, and efforts to identify factors likely to improve human–robot interaction, little attention has been paid to how participants evaluate their robotic partner in the unfolding of actual interactions. This paper draws from qualitative analyses of (...) video-recorded interactions between a robot and groups of participants, in the framework of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. We analyse the particular ways in which participants shape their embodied actions, how they can reproduce a prior action that failed to obtain a response from the robot; and how they explore the robot’s embodied nature. We find a set of recurrent methods or practices, showing that robot-recipient design displays not only participants’ initial assumptions about the robot’s competences, but also more importantly perhaps their continuous assessment of the robot’s behaviour, and their attempts to adapt to it. Participants locally produce and constantly revise their understanding of the robot as a more or less competent co-participant, drawing from its past, current, and projected conduct and responsiveness. We discuss the implications of these findings for research in robotics and human–robot interactions, and the value of the approach to shed new light on old questions by paying attention to the quality of gesture and the sequential organisation of interaction. (shrink)

Empirical research on human–robot interaction has demonstrated how humans tend to react to social robots with empathic responses and moral behavior. How should we ethically evaluate such responses to robots? Are people wrong to treat non-sentient artefacts as moral patients since this rests on anthropomorphism and ‘over-identification’ —or correct since spontaneous moral intuition and behavior toward nonhumans is indicative for moral patienthood, such that social robots become our ‘Others’?. In this research paper, I weave extant HRI studies that demonstrate empathic (...) responses toward robots with the recent debate on moral status for robots, on which the ethical evaluation of moral behavior toward them is dependent. Patienthood for robots has standardly been thought to obtain on some intrinsic ground, such as being sentient, conscious, or having interest. But since these attempts neglect moral experience and are curbed by epistemic difficulties, I take inspiration from Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s ‘relational approach’ to explore an alternative way of accounting for robot patienthood based on extrinsic premises. Based on the ethics of Danish theologian K. E. Løgstrup I argue that empathic responses can be interpreted as sovereign expressions of life and that these expressions benefit human subjects—even if they emerge from social interaction afforded by robots we have anthropomorphized. I ultimately develop an argument in defense of treating robots as moral patients. (shrink)

With the desired outcome of social good within the wider robotics ecosystem, trust is identified as the central adhesive of the human–robot interaction (HRI) interface. However, building trust between humans and robots involves more than improving the machine’s technical reliability or trustworthiness in function. This paper presents a holistic, community-based approach to trust-building, where trust is understood as a multifaceted and multi-staged looped relation that depends heavily on context and human perceptions. Building on past literature that identifies dispositional and learned (...) stages of trust, our proposed decision to trust model considers more extensively the human and situational factors influencing how trust manifests within social relations. Priority is given to the human user of technology—the initiator of human—robot trust relations—at all stages of decision-making. The envisioned formation of optimal conditions in which trust emerges requires the collective participation of practitioners, policymakers, and members of the community. With trust facilitating the smooth transition of robots into more socially embedded roles, positive receptivity of the best engineering project arises from the presence of harmonious robot-human trust relations in community spaces. (shrink)

Current research in human–robot interaction often focuses on rendering communication between humans and robots more ‘natural’ by designing machines that appear and behave humanlike. Communication, in this human-centric approach, is often understood as a process of successfully transmitting information in the form of predefined messages and gestures. This article introduces an alternative arts-led, movement-centric approach, which embraces the differences of machinelike robotic artefacts and, instead, investigates how meaning is dynamically enacted in the encounter of humans and machines. Our design approach (...) revolves around a novel embodied mapping methodology, which serves to bridge between human–machine asymmetries and socioculturally situate abstract robotic artefacts. Building on concepts from performativity, material agency, enactive sense-making and kinaesthetic empathy, our Machine Movement Lab project opens up a performative-relational model of human–machine communication, where meaning is generated through relational dynamics in the interaction itself. (shrink)

Despite the reality that self-learning artificial intelligence systems (SLAIS) are gaining in sophistication, humanity’s focus regarding SLAIS-human interactions are unnervingly centred upon transnational commercial sectors and, most generally, around issues of intellectual property law. But as SLAIS gain greater environmental interaction capabilities in digital spaces, or the ability to self-author code to drive their development as algorithmic models, a concern arises as to whether a system that displays a “deceptive” level of human-like engagement with users in our physical world ought (...) to be uniquely protected. Although many voices in the legal and technology realms have continued to argue against unique protections for digital entities, the fact at hand is that SLAIS design is becoming increasingly anthropomorphic so as to make these systems more capable of interacting with a wide range of (potentially) vulnerable populations—generally as a means to enhance these populations’ overall well-being. To frame this concern in a different way, the specific question at hand is whether a human’s “ownership” of such an advanced SLAIS is legal, considering that it (or they) may possess intelligence on par with a human or a convincing-enough display of such behaviour. Given that “ownership” over entities with (seemingly) intelligent behaviours consistent with human populations has been effectively banned by the international community, an examination into this subject and its implications is wholly necessary given humanity’s quest to exist solely in digital environments through whatever means possible. (shrink)

The use of robotic technology in healthcare is increasing. The aim was to explore attitudes toward the use of humanoid robots in healthcare among patients, relatives, care professionals, school actors and other relevant actors in healthcare and to analyze the associations between participants’ background variables and attitudes. The data were collected through a cross-sectional survey (N = 264) in 2018 where participants met a humanoid robot. The survey was comprised of background variables and items from a modified Robot Attitude Scale. (...) Multiple linear regression analysis and Spearman’s Rho correlation were used to analyze associations between variables. Most of the participants were positive toward the use of humanoid robots in healthcare and only a few were negative. Attitudes toward the use of humanoid robots were more positive among other relevant actors, such as service personnel and politicians in healthcare, participants with a higher educational level and older adults. More research is needed on the reasons underlying negative attitudes because these might affect the introduction of humanoid robots in healthcare. A careful evaluation of appropriate first target groups as well as which tasks are appropriate for humanoid robots to perform in healthcare are needed. (shrink)

Robots that incorporate the function of apologizing have emerged in recent years. This paper examines the moral permissibility of making robots apologize. First, I characterize the nature of apology based on analyses conducted in multiple scholarly domains. Next, I present a prima facie argument that robot apologies are not permissible because they may harm human societies by inducing the misattribution of responsibility. Subsequently, I respond to a possible response to the prima facie objection based on the interpretation that attributing responsibility (...) to a robot is analogous to having an attitude toward fiction. Then, I demonstrate that there are cases of robot apologies where the prima facie objection does not apply, by considering the following two points: (1) apology-related practices found in our human-to-human apologies, and (2) a difference in the degree of harm caused by robot failures and the resulting apologies. Finally, given the current norms governing our apology-related practices, I argue that some instances of making robots apologize are permissible, and I propose conducting critical robotics research questioning the validity of such norms. (shrink)

Technological progress may eventually produce sophisticated robots with human-like traits that result in humans forming meaningful relationships with them. Such relationships would likely lead to a demand for human–artificial intelligence matrimony. U.S. Supreme Court decisions that expanded the definition of marriage to include interracial and same-sex couples, as well as those that have not extended marriage to polygamous relationships, provide guidance regarding the criteria that human–AI would have to meet to successfully assert a right to marry. Ultimately, robots will have (...) to possess certain characteristics of personhood to marry, including the capacity to contract and to engage in an intimate relationship. Alternatively, if AIs can simulate these abilities sufficiently, we may believe that they have these capacities. Even if AIs genuinely possess the capabilities necessary to enter into a marriage, it is social acceptance of intelligent non-humans as life partners that will likely influence legal development is this realm rather than personhood criteria. However, AIs are likely to face bias due to their “artificial” rather than biological nature. Yet, Peter Singer’s influential argument regarding speciesism in the context of animal rights implies that AIs with specific human-like qualities cannot be justifiably denied certain rights. (shrink)

In the scenario of growing polarization of promises and dangers that surround artificial intelligence (AI), how to introduce responsible AI and robotics in healthcare? In this paper, we develop an ethical–political approach to introduce democratic mechanisms to technological development, what we call “Caring in the In-Between”. Focusing on the multiple possibilities for action that emerge in the realm of uncertainty, we propose an ethical and responsible framework focused on care actions in between fears and hopes. Using the theoretical perspective of (...) Science and Technology Studies and empirical research, “Caring in the In-Between” is based on three movements: the first is a change of focus from the world of promises and dangers to the world of uncertainties; the second is a conceptual shift from assuming a relationship with robotics based on a Human–Robot Interaction to another focused on the network in which the robot is embedded (the “Robot Embedded in a Network”); and the last is an ethical shift from a general normative framework to a discussion on the context of use. Based on these suggestions, “Caring in the In-Between” implies institutional challenges, as well as new practices in healthcare systems. It is articulated around three simultaneous processes, each of them related to practical actions in the “in-between” dimensions considered: monitoring relations and caring processes, through public engagement and institutional changes; including concerns and priorities of stakeholders, with the organization of participatory processes and alternative forms of representation; and making fears and hopes commensurable, through the choice of progressive and reversible actions. (shrink)

In this text, our question is what is the current regulatory trend in countries that are not considered central in the development of artificial intelligence, such as Brazil: a preventive approach, or an experimental approach? We will analyze the bills (PL) that are being processed in legislative houses at the state level, and at the federal level, highlighting some elements, such as: Delimitation of the object (conceptualization), fundamental principles, ethical guidelines, relationship with human work, human supervision, and guidelines for public (...) authorities. Based on these elements, we identified how the issues that drive the contemporary debate on AI have been addressed in these legislative initiatives. The results indicate that the strongest national regulation proposal mentions risks, rights, governance, economic agents; these mentions dialogue with the concerns discussed by researchers around the world, regarding the mitigation and prevention of risks, regarding the preservation of individual and collective rights, the role of the State as a regulator and supervisor, and, as was to be expected, the maintenance of economic policies that possibly tend to protect the market; proposes that the foundations of the development, implementation and use of AI have values consistent with ‘human centered AI’ (Bingley et al. 2023), but also points to the neoliberal matrix; introduces human supervision as an effective element in the AI systems cycle; the trend that we can observe in Brazil is the configuration of a regulation that harmonizes articles that favor the preventive approach, with the presence of articles that favor the experimentation approach. (shrink)

This article reflects on securitization efforts with respect to ‘killer robots’, known more impartially as autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Our contribution focuses, theoretically and empirically, on the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a transnational advocacy network vigorously pushing for a pre-emptive ban on AWS. Marking exactly a decade of its activity, there is still no international regime formally banning, or even purposefully regulating, AWS. Our objective is to understand why the Campaign has not been able to advance its disarmament agenda (...) thus far, despite all the resources, means and support at its disposal. For achieving this objective, we challenge the popular assumption that strong stigmatization is the universally best strategy towards humanitarian disarmament. We investigate the consequences of two specifics present in AWS, which set them apart from processes and successes of the campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and laser-blinding weapons: the complexity of AWS as a distinct weapons category, and the subsequent circumvention of its complexity through the utilization of pop-culture, namely science fiction imagery. We particularly focus on two mechanisms through which such distortion has occurred: hybridization and grafting. These provide the conceptual basis and heuristic tools to unpack the paradox of over-securitization: success in broadening the stakeholder base in relation to the first mechanism and deepening the sense of insecurity in relation to the second one does not necessarily lead to the achievement of the desired prohibitory norm. In conclusion, we ask whether it is not the time for a more epistemically-oriented expert debate with a less ambitious, lowest common denominator strategy as the preferred model of arms control for such a complex weapons category. (shrink)

The article examines the problem of ensuring the political stability of a democratic social system with a shortage of a vital commodity (like vaccine against COVID-19). In such a system, members of society citizens assess the authorities. Thus, actions by the authorities to increase the supply of this commodity can contribute to citizens' approval and hence political stability. However, this supply is influenced by random factors, the actions of competitors, etc. Therefore, citizens do not have sufficient information about all the (...) possibilities of supplying, and it is difficult for them to make the right decisions. Such citizen unawareness can be exploited by unscrupulous politicians to achieve personal targets. Therefore, it is necessary to organize public control to motivate politicians to use all available opportunities in supplying. The goal of the paper is to build such a digital mechanism of public control of the politicians by citizens, which would best assess and stimulate the activities of the authorities to improve the supply of a vital commodity. In the age of artificial intelligence, such digital public control in the face of uncertainty can be based on digital machine learning. In addition, it is necessary to take into account and model the activities of politicians associated with the presence of their own targets that do not coincide with public ones. Such politicians can use the learning of citizens for their own targets. The objective of the article is to build an optimal digital mechanism of public control in a two-level model of a democratic social system—a digital society. At its top level, there is the Citizen, who gives an assessment for the Politico located at the lower level. In turn, the Politico can influence the supplying of a vital commodity. Political stability is guaranteed if the Citizen regularly approves of the Politico’s actions to increase this supply. However, the Politico may not use the opportunities available to him to offer a commodity to achieve a personal target. To avoid this, the Politico’s control mechanism is proposed. It includes the procedure for digital learning of the Citizen, as well as a procedure for assessing the Politico activity. Sufficient conditions have been found for the synthesis of such the Politico’s control mechanism, at which stochastic possibilities of increasing the supply of a vital commodity are used. The example of such the Politico’s control mechanism is considered on the case of supply of the COVID-19 vaccine in England. (shrink)

In the future, it is likely that we will form strong bonds of attachment and even develop love for social robots. Some of these loving relations will be, from the human’s perspective, as significant as a loving relationship that they might have had with another human. This means that, from the perspective of the loving human, the mindless destruction of their robot partner could be as devastating as the murder of another’s human partner. Yet, the loving partner of a robot (...) has no recourse to legal action beyond the destruction of property and can see no way to prevent future people suffering the same devastating loss. On this basis, some have argued that such a scenario must surely motivate legal protection for social robots. In this paper, I argue that despite the devastating loss that would come from the destruction of one’s robot partner, love cannot itself be a reason for granting robot rights. However, although I argue against beloved robots having protective rights, I argue that the loss of a robot partner must be socially recognised as a form of bereavement if further secondary harms are to be avoided, and that, if certain conditions obtain, the destruction of a beloved robot could be criminalised as a hate crime. (shrink)

AI and robotic technologies attract much hype, including utopian and dystopian future visions of technologically driven provision in the health and care sectors. Based on 30 interviews with scientists, clinicians and other stakeholders in the UK, Europe, USA, Australia, and New Zealand, this paper interrogates how those engaged in developing and using AI and robotic applications in health and care characterize their future promise, potential and challenges. We explore the ways in which these professionals articulate and navigate a range of (...) high and low expectations, and promissory and cautionary future visions, around AI and robotic technologies. We argue that, through these articulations and navigations, they construct their own perceptions of socially and ethically ‘acceptable futures’ framed by an ‘ethics of expectations.’ This imbues the envisioned futures with a normative character, articulated in relation to the present context. We build on existing work in the sociology of expectations, aiming to contribute towards better understanding of how technoscientific expectations are navigated and managed by professionals. This is particularly timely since the COVID-19 pandemic gave further momentum to these technologies. (shrink)

Currently, our official rationality is still of a Cartesian kind; we are still embedded in a mechanistic order that takes it that separate, countable entities (spatial forms), related logically to each other, are the only ‘things’ that matter to us—an order clearly suited to advances in robotics. Unfortunately, it is an order that renders invisible ‘relational things’, non-objective things that exist in time, in the transitions from one state of affairs to another, things that ‘point’ toward possibilities in the future, (...) which mean something to us. I have called such things, hermeneutical–dialogical ‘things’ as they gradually emerge in our back-and-forth, step-by-step relations to the others and otherneses in our surroundings; they consist in the ‘promissory’ things sustaining our trust in each other and in our authorities, in our social organizations and social institutions, and in our culture. Clearly, we need to understand better, not only what robots can, and cannot do, but also the long-term ethical and political implications of inserting robotic activities into our everyday ways of relating ourselves to our surroundings if we are to avoid the dystopian futures envisaged by some. Descartes’ aim of “making ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature,” forgets our larger task of our making ourselves into human beings—of doing together in dialog what we cannot do apart. (shrink)

In the scenario of growing polarization of promises and dangers that surround artificial intelligence (AI), how to introduce responsible AI and robotics in healthcare? In this paper, we develop an ethical–political approach to introduce democratic mechanisms to technological development, what we call “Caring in the In-Between”. Focusing on the multiple possibilities for action that emerge in the realm of uncertainty, we propose an ethical and responsible framework focused on care actions in between fears and hopes. Using the theoretical perspective of (...) Science and Technology Studies and empirical research, “Caring in the In-Between” is based on three movements: the first is a change of focus from the world of promises and dangers to the world of uncertainties; the second is a conceptual shift from assuming a relationship with robotics based on a Human–Robot Interaction to another focused on the network in which the robot is embedded (the “Robot Embedded in a Network”); and the last is an ethical shift from a general normative framework to a discussion on the context of use. Based on these suggestions, “Caring in the In-Between” implies institutional challenges, as well as new practices in healthcare systems. It is articulated around three simultaneous processes, each of them related to practical actions in the “in-between” dimensions considered: monitoring relations and caring processes, through public engagement and institutional changes; including concerns and priorities of stakeholders, with the organization of participatory processes and alternative forms of representation; and making fears and hopes commensurable, through the choice of progressive and reversible actions. (shrink)

In the present study, qualitative and quantitative studies were conducted to explore differences between stakeholders in expectations of gendered robots, with a focus on their specific application in the field of psychotherapy. In Study I, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 18 experts in psychotherapy to extract categories of opinions regarding the use of humanoid robots in the field. Based on these extracted categories, in Study II, an online questionnaire survey was conducted to compare concrete expectations of the use of humanoid (...) robots in psychotherapy between 50 experts and 100 nonexperts in psychotherapy. The results revealed that compared with the female participants, the male participants tended to prefer robots with a female appearance. In addition, compared with the experts, the nonexperts tended not to relate the performance of robots with their gender appearance, and compared with the other participant groups, the female expert participants had lower expectations of the use of robots in the field. These findings suggest that differences between stakeholders regarding the expectations of gendered robots should be resolved to encourage their acceptance in a specific field. (shrink)

Well-being is an important policy concept including in discussions around the use of artificial intelligence, machine learning and robotics. Disabled people experience challenges in their well-being. Therefore, the aim of our scoping review study of academic abstracts employing Scopus, IEEE Xplore, Compendex and the 70 databases from EBSCO-HOST as sources was to better understand how academic literature focusing on AI/ML/robotics engages with well-being in relation to disabled people. Our objective was to answer the following research question: how and to what (...) extent does the AI/ML/robot literature we covered include well-being in relation to disabled people? We found 2071 academic abstracts covering AI/ML and well-being, and 1055 covering robotics and well-being. Within these abstracts, only 39 covered AI/ML and 48 robotics and well-being in relation to disabled people. The tone of the coverage was techno-positive and techno-optimistic arguing that AI/ML/robotics could improve the well-being of disabled people in general or improve well-being by helping disabled people overcome their ‘disability’ or make tasks easier. No negative effects that AI/ML/robotics could have or has had on the well-being of disabled people were mentioned. Disabled people were portrayed only within patient, client, or user roles but not in their roles as stakeholders in the governance of AI/ML/robotics discussions. This biased and limited coverage of the impact of AI/ML/robotics on the well-being of disabled people disempowers disabled people. (shrink)

Algorithmic systems that provide services to people by supporting or replacing human decision-making promise greater convenience in various areas. The opacity of these applications, however, means that it is not clear how much they truly serve their users. A promising way to address the issue of possible undesired biases consists in giving users control by letting them configure a system and aligning its performance with users’ own preferences. However, as the present paper argues, this form of control over an algorithmic (...) system demands an algorithmic literacy that also entails a certain way of making oneself knowable: users must interrogate their own dispositions and see how these can be formalized such that they can be translated into the algorithmic system. This may, however, extend already existing practices through which people are monitored and probed and means that exerting such control requires users to direct a computational mode of thinking at themselves. (shrink)

My analysis takes as its point of departure the controversial assumption that contemporary ethical theories cannot capture adequately the ethical and social challenges of scientific and technological development. This assumption is rooted in the argument that classical ethical theory invariably addresses the issue of ethical responsibility in terms of whether and how intentional actions of individuals can be justified. Scientific and technological developments, however, have produced unintentional consequences and side-consequences. These consequences very often result from collective decisions concerning the way (...) we wish to organise our economies and society, rather than from individual actions. It has been apparent for a long time now that it is not sufficient to construct an ethics of science and technology on the basis of the image of a scientist who intentionally wants to create a Frankenstein. Thus, as a minimum we would require an ethical framework that addresses both the aspect of unintentional side consequences (rather than intentional actions) and the aspect of collective decisions (rather than individual decisions) with regard to complex societal systems, such as the operation of our economy. We do not have such a theory available. More disturbing than the principle shortcomings of ethical theory are the shortcomings of conventional ethical practice with respect to technological developments. Below I will suggest how four different developments can illustrate these shortcomings, which centre around the fact that individuals in our society can simply not be held fully accountable for their individual role within the context of scientific technological developments. I will call these shortcomings of a theory (and practice) of individual role responsibility. This may help us to reflect on robotics too, insofar as robots may be perceived as replacements for “roles”. From there, I will argue why we have to shift our attention to an ethics of knowledge assessment in the framework of deliberative procedures, elaborating on implications of these developments for the field of robotics. (shrink)