As robots increasingly become part of our everyday lives, questions arise with regards to how to approach them and how to understand them in social contexts. The Western history of human–robot relations revolves around competition and control, which restricts our ability to relate to machines in other ways. In this study, we take a relational approach to explore different manners of socializing with robots, especially those that exceed an instrumental approach. The nonhuman subjects of this study are built to explore (...) non-purposeful behavior, in an attempt to break away from the assumptions of utility that underlie the hegemonic human–machine interactions. This breakaway is accompanied by ‘learning to be attuned’ on the side of the human subjects, which is facilitated by continuous relations at the level of everyday life. Our paper highlights this ground for the emergence of meanings and questions that could not be subsumed by frameworks of control and domination. The research-creation project Machine Ménagerie serves as a case study for these ideas, demonstrating a relational approach in which the designer and the machines co-constitute each other through sustained interactions, becoming attuned to one another through the performance of research. Machine Ménagerie attempts to produce affective and playful—if not unruly—nonhuman entities that invite interaction yet have no intention of serving human social or physical needs. We diverge from other social robotics research by creating machines that do not attempt to mimic human social behaviours. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence and robots may progressively take a more and more prominent place in our daily environment. Interestingly, in the study of how humans perceive these artificial entities, science has mainly taken an anthropocentric perspective (i.e., how distant from humans are these agents). Considering people’s fears and expectations from robots and artificial intelligence, they tend to be simultaneously afraid and allured to them, much as they would be to the conceptualisations related to the divine entities (e.g., gods). In two experiments, (...) we investigated the proximity of representation between artificial entities (i.e., artificial intelligence and robots), divine entities and natural entities (i.e., humans and other animals) at both an explicit (Study 1) and an implicit level (Study 2). In the first study, participants evaluated these entities explicitly on positive and negative attitudes. Hierarchical clustering analysis showed that participants’ representation of artificial intelligence, robots and divine entities were similar, while the representation of humans tended to be associated with that of animals. In the second study, participants carried out a word/non-word decision task including religious semantic-related words and neutral words after the presentation of a masked prime referring to divine entities, artificial entities and natural entities (or a control prime). Results showed that after divine and artificial entity primes, participants were faster to identify religious words as words compared to neutral words arguing for a semantic activation. We conclude that people make sense of the new entities by relying on already familiar entities and in the case of artificial intelligence and robots, people appear to draw parallels to divine entities. (shrink)

The social and cultural causes behind the widespread use and acceptance of robots in Japan are not yet completely understood. This study compares humans and robots in images gathered through Google searches in Japanese and in English. Numerous pictures obtained by the search in Japanese were found to have a human and a robot looking together at something else (“third item”), whereas many of the images acquired by search in English show a human and a robot facing each other. This (...) is similar to the composition of mother and child in paintings: in _ukiyo-e_ that was painted mainly in the Edo period of Japan, the mother and child are often depicted together viewing something other than themselves, whereas this is not the case in Western paintings of mother and child. It has also been pointed out that, in modern Western paintings, the world inside the picture is separated from the outside world, forming an independent microcosmos, whereas the inside and outside are continuous in Japanese paintings. These may indicate that, in Japanese society, robots are to a certain extent regarded as fellow human beings who can share the third item. In Western society, on the other hand, no code is embedded that can fix robots’ superiority or inferiority to humans, which would easily trigger an antagonistic view toward artificial intelligence (AI)/robots as threatening entities, as shown in most of Western literature and movies. We suggest that such cultural characteristics of Japanese society can contribute to enhance coexistence with AI/robots. (shrink)

With recent major progress in AI, AI-driven robots are expected to operate outside of their original settings, such as factory floors, and be integrated into our daily lives. In this trajectory, integrating culture, with its broad and vague meaning, into human–robot interaction becomes a concern for the field of social robotics. In this article, we propose a culturally-responsive robot as a concept that encapsulates critical theoretical and experimental studies of culture in robotics without subscribing to the dominant view of the (...) field that translates culture only to nationality. The main contribution of this article is to propose a methodology for implementing culturally-responsive robots, termed “robot-ethnographers.” Drawing from the long history of conventional ethnography, we define a robot-ethnographer as a robot situated within interaction contexts, shaping interactions, and learning culture through observation to adapt its behaviours accordingly. The paper analyses the properties of the robot-ethnographer in line with those of conventional ethnography in social science. Whilst acknowledging important technological limitations, this article concludes that robot-ethnographers can create culturally-responsive human–robot interactions. (shrink)

The import of computational learning theories and techniques on the ethics of human-robot interaction is explored in the context of recent developments of personal robotics. An epistemological reflection enables one to isolate a variety of background hypotheses that are needed to achieve successful learning from experience in autonomous personal robots. The conjectural character of these background hypotheses brings out theoretical and practical limitations in our ability to predict and control the behaviour of learning robots in their interactions with humans. Responsibility (...) ascription problems, which concern damages caused by learning robot actions, are analyzed in the light of these epistemic limitations. Finally, a broad framework is outlined for ethically motivated scientific inquiries, which aim at improving our capability to understand, anticipate, and selectively cope with harmful errors by learning robots. (shrink)

Japan has more robots than any other country with robots contributing to many areas of society, including manufacturing, healthcare, and entertainment. However, few studies have examined Japanese attitudes toward robots, and none has used implicit measures. This study compares attitudes among the faculty of a US and a Japanese university. Although the Japanese faculty reported many more experiences with robots, implicit measures indicated both faculties had more pleasant associations with humans. In addition, although the US faculty reported people were more (...) threatening than robots, implicit measures indicated both faculties associated weapons more strongly with robots than with humans. Despite the media’s hype about Japan’s robot ‘craze,’ response similarities suggest factors other than attitude better explain robot adoption. These include differences in history and religion, personal and human identity, economic structure, professional specialization, and government policy. Japanese robotics offers a unique reference from which other nations may learn. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, ethical challenges related to robotics technologies have gained increasing interest among different research and non-academic communities, in particular through the field of roboethics. While the reasons to address roboethics are clear, why not to engage with ethics needs to be better understood. This paper focuses on a limited or lacking engagement with ethics that takes place within some parts of the robotics community and its implications for the conceptualisation of the human being. The underlying assumption (...) is that the term ‘ethical’ essentially means ‘human’. Thus, this paper discusses a working hypothesis according to which by avoiding to engage with roboethics, roboticists contribute to the tacit dehumanisation process emerging in and outside of robotics. An alternative approach includes ‘lived ethics’ which involves not only incorporating formal ethical approaches into the roboticists’ work but also ‘being’ ethical and actually engaging with ethical reflection and practice. (shrink)

A growing body of research can be found in which roboticists are designing for reciprocity as a key construct for successful human–robot interaction (HRI). Given the centrality of reciprocity as a component for our moral lives (for moral development and maintaining the just society), this paper confronts the possibility of what things would look like if the benchmark to achieve perceived reciprocity were accomplished. Through an analysis of the value of reciprocity from the care ethics tradition the richness of reciprocity (...) as an inherent value is revealed: on the micro-level, as mutual care for immediate care givers, and on the macro-level, as foundational for a just society. Taking this understanding of reciprocity into consideration, it becomes clear that HRI cannot achieve this bidirectional value of reciprocity; a robot must deceive users into believing it is capable of reciprocating to humans or is deserving of reciprocation from humans. Moreover, on the macro-level, designing social robots for reciprocity threatens the ability and willingness to reciprocate to human care workers across society. Because of these concerns, I suggest re-thinking the goals of reciprocity in social robotics. Designing for reciprocity in social robotics should be dedicated to the design of robots to enhance the ability to mutually care for those that provide us with care, as opposed to designing for reciprocity between human and robot. (shrink)

Mobility robots may soon be among us, triggering a need for safety regulation. Robot safety regulation, however, remains underexplored, with only a few articles analyzing what regulatory approaches could be feasible. This article offers an account of the available regulatory strategies and attempts to theorize the effects of simulation-based safety regulation. The article first discusses the distinctive features of mobility robots as regulatory targets and argues that emergent behavior constitutes the key regulatory concern in designing robot safety regulation regimes. In (...) contrast to many accounts, the article posits that emergent behavior dynamics do not arise from robot autonomy, learning capability, or code unexplainability. Instead, they emerge from the complexity of robot technological constitutions coupled with near-infinite environmental variability and non-linear performance dynamics of the machine learning components. Second, the article reviews rules-based and performance-based regulation and argues that both will fail adequately constrain emergent robot behaviors. The article claims that controlling mobility robots requires a simulation-based regulatory approach. Simulation-based regulation is a novelty with significant theoretical and practical implications. The article argues that the approach signifies a radical break in regulatory forms of knowledge and temporalities. Simulations enact virtual futures to create a new regulatory knowledge type. Practically, the novel safety knowledge type may destabilize the existing conceptual space of safety politics and liability allocation patterns. (shrink)

The present paper explores the realm of indexicals, with a focus on self-locating thoughts, assessing their role in agency. Philosophers have actively discussed the problem of indexicals since the groundbreaking work of David Kaplan and John Perry, and the ongoing debate continues to this day. The paper also discusses an externalist perspective on thought-content while aiming to illustrate the essential role of indexicals in self-locating thoughts, encompassing those found within the self-locating representations of robots. The paper describes a scenario in (...) which Perry the robot, as it is named, becomes disoriented. The robot’s established objective is to navigate through the surroundings while indispensably engaging in self-location. In addition, the paper discusses Paul Teller’s example of robots autonomously following instructions based on third-person representations. Teller’s aim is to present an instance of genuine action devoid of the use of indexicals. In opposition to Teller’s viewpoint, the paper puts forth a form of internalism, termed robot-internalism, asserting that indexical thoughts are internal to individuals, whether human or robot, arguing that indexicals are necessary for the agency of both humans and robots. (shrink)

As automated technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making (ADM), become integral to social life, there is growing concern about their ethical implications. While issues of accountability, transparency, and fairness dominate discussions on “ethical” AI, little attention has been given to how socially disadvantaged groups most impacted by ADM systems form ethical judgments about them. Drawing on insights from relational ethics, this study uses dialogue groups with disabled people to explore how people distinguish between ‘more just’ or ‘less just’ (...) uses of technology, and the contextual, situational, and relational factors that shape these judgments. For the dialogue group participants in our study, ethical reasoning was most strongly influenced by concerns about how ADM systems affect self-determination, caring relationships and identity recognition, and about the political–economic drivers of automation. The article contributes to AI ethics by empirically demonstrating that justice and ethics depend on the social relationships valued in different contexts and what is at stake, both personally and politically, in decisions aided by automation. (shrink)

Robots that can communicate with people are one of the goals reached by the technology developed for automation in work life. Experts aim to improve the communication skills of these robots further in the near future. Besides, various studies emphasize that people may interact with robots in a similar way as they interact with other people. In line of this idea, this study examines the possible causal chain in which the social anxiety affects the robot anxiety which in turn affects (...) the attitude toward interacting with robots. Data obtained from university students were analyzed in a simple and parallel mediation model. The results showed that robot anxiety and in particular two of its sub-dimensions mediate the relationship between social anxiety and negative attitudes toward interaction with robots. Researchers should carry out new studies about the common structural characteristics of the anxiety felt by people due to interacting with humans and robots. (shrink)

Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: (...) can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research. (shrink)

As humanoid social robots are developed rapidly in recent years and experimented in social situations, comparing them to humans provides insights into practical as well as philosophical concerns. This study uses the theoretical framework of communication constraints, derived in human–human communication research, to compare whether people apply social-oriented constraints and task-oriented constraints differently to human targets versus humanoid social robot targets. A total of 230 students from the University of Hawaii at Manoa participated in the study. The participants completed a (...) questionnaire, which determined their concern for the five communication constraints (feelings, non-imposition, disapproval, clarity, and effectiveness) in situations involving humans or robots. The results show people were more concerned with avoiding hurting the human’s feelings, avoiding inconveniencing the human interactive partner, and avoiding being disliked by the human and less concerned with avoiding hurting the robot’s feelings, avoiding inconveniencing the robot partner, and avoiding being disliked by the robot. But people did not differ in their concerns of the two task-oriented constraints (clarity and effectiveness) in response to humans versus humanoid robots. The results of the research suggest that people are more likely to emphasize the social-oriented constraints in communication with humans. (shrink)

As we step into an era in which artificial intelligence systems are predicted to surpass human capabilities, a number of profound ethical questions have emerged. One such question, which has gained some traction in recent scholarship, concerns the ethics of human treatment of robots and the thought-provoking possibility of robot rights. The present article explores this very aspect, with a particular focus on the notion of human rights for robots. It argues that if we accept the widely held view that (...) moral status and rights (including human rights) are grounded in certain cognitive capacities, then it follows that intelligent machines could, in principle, acquire these entitlements once they come to possess the requisite properties. In support of this perspective, the article outlines the moral foundations of human rights and examines several main objections, arguing that they do not successfully negate the prospect of considering robots as potential holders of human rights. Subsequently, it turns to the key epistemic challenges associated with moral status and rights for robots, outlining the main difficulties in discerning the presence of mental states in artificial entities and offering some practical considerations for approaching these challenges. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of establishing a suitable framework for moral decision-making under uncertainty in the context of human treatment of artificial entities, given the gravity of the epistemic problems surrounding the concepts of artificial consciousness, moral status, and rights. (shrink)

The challenge of designing computer systems and robots with the ability to make moral judgments is stepping out of science fiction and moving into the laboratory. Engineers and scholars, anticipating practical necessities, are writing articles, participating in conference workshops, and initiating a few experiments directed at substantiating rudimentary moral reasoning in hardware and software. The subject has been designated by several names, including machine ethics, machine morality, artificial morality, or computational morality. Most references to the challenge elucidate one facet or (...) another of what is a very rich topic. This paper will offer a brief overview of the many dimensions of this new field of inquiry. (shrink)

Bringing human–robot interaction (HRI) into conversation with scholarship from human geography, this paper considers how socially interactive robots become important agents in the production of social space and explores the utility of core geographic concepts of _scale_ and _place_ to critically examine evolving robotic spatialities. The paper grounds this discussion through reflections on a collaborative, interdisciplinary research project studying the development and deployment of interactive museum tour-guiding robots on a North American university campus. The project is a collaboration among geographers, (...) roboticists, a digital artist, and the directors/curators of two museums, and involves experimentation in the development of a tour-guiding robot with a “socially aware navigation system” alongside ongoing critical reflection into the socio-spatial context of human–robot interactions and their future possibilities. The paper reflects on the tensions between logics of control and contingency in robotic spatiality and argues that concepts of scale and place can help reflect on this tension in a productive way while calling attention to a broader range of stakeholders who should be included in robotic design and deployment. (shrink)

Learning is a central component of human life and essential for personal development. Therefore, utilizing new technologies in the learning context and exploring their combined potential are considered essential to support self-directed learning in a digital age. A learning environment can be expanded by various technical and content-related aspects. Gamification in the form of elements from video games offers a potential concept to support the learning process. This can be supplemented by technology-supported learning. While the use of tablets is already (...) widespread in the learning context, the integration of a social robot can provide new perspectives on the learning process. However, simply adding new technologies such as social robots or gamification to existing systems may not automatically result in a better learning environment. In the present study, game elements as well as a social robot were integrated separately and conjointly into a learning environment for basic Spanish skills, with a follow-up on retained knowledge. This allowed us to investigate the respective and combined effects of both expansions on motivation, engagement and learning effect. This approach should provide insights into the integration of both additions in an adult learning context. We found that the additions of game elements and the robot did not significantly improve learning, engagement or motivation. Based on these results and a literature review, we outline relevant factors for meaningful integration of gamification and social robots in learning environments in adult learning. (shrink)

This article makes the case for including frameworks of media ecology and mobilities research in the shaping of critical robotics research for a human-centered and holistic lens onto robot technologies. The two meta-disciplines, which align in their attention to relational processes of communication and movement, provide useful tools for critically exploring emerging human–robot dimensions and dynamics. Media ecology approaches human-made technologies as media that can shape the way we think, feel, and act. Relatedly, mobilities research highlights various kinds of influential (...) movement and stillness of people, things, and ideas. The emerging field of critical robotics research can benefit from such attention to the ways of thinking, feeling, and moving robotic forms and environments encourage and discourage. Drawing on various studies into robotics, I illustrate those conceptual alignments of media ecology, mobilities, and critical robotics research and point to the value of this interdisciplinary approach to robots as media and robotics as socio-cultural environments. (shrink)

Bringing human–robot interaction (HRI) into conversation with scholarship from human geography, this paper considers how socially interactive robots become important agents in the production of social space and explores the utility of core geographic concepts of scale and place to critically examine evolving robotic spatialities. The paper grounds this discussion through reflections on a collaborative, interdisciplinary research project studying the development and deployment of interactive museum tour-guiding robots on a North American university campus. The project is a collaboration among geographers, (...) roboticists, a digital artist, and the directors/curators of two museums, and involves experimentation in the development of a tour-guiding robot with a “socially aware navigation system” alongside ongoing critical reflection into the socio-spatial context of human–robot interactions and their future possibilities. The paper reflects on the tensions between logics of control and contingency in robotic spatiality and argues that concepts of scale and place can help reflect on this tension in a productive way while calling attention to a broader range of stakeholders who should be included in robotic design and deployment. (shrink)

With the development of increasingly sophisticated sociable robots, robot-human relationships are being transformed. Not only can sociable robots furnish emotional support and companionship for humans, humans can also form relationships with robots that they value highly. It is natural to ask, do robots that stand in close relationships with us have any moral standing over and above their purely instrumental value as means to human ends. We might ask our question this way, ‘Are there ways we can act towards robots (...) that would be wrong to the robot?’ To address this, Part I lays out standard approaches to moral standing: appealing to intrinsic properties, human responses, and values inhering in relationships. Part II explores the third, relational strategy in detail. Looking beyond Western analyses, it considers Eastern philosophy and the environmental philosophy of 'deep ecology' and extends these approaches to sociable robots. Part III examines practical implications for the case of Samantha, a sex robot that was allegedly raped. Part IV identifies and replies to objections. (shrink)

Service and personal care robots are starting to cross the threshold into the wilderness of everyday life, where they are supposed to interact with inexperienced lay users in a changing environment. In order to function as intended, robots must become independent entities that monitor themselves and improve their own behaviours based on learning outcomes in practice. This poses a great challenge to robotics, which we are calling the “autonomy-safety-paradox” (ASP). The integration of robot applications into society requires the reconciliation of (...) two conflicting aspects: increasing machine autonomy and ensuring safety in end-use. As the level of robot autonomy grows, the risk of accidents will increase, and it will become more and more difficult to identify who is responsible for any damage incurred. However, emphasizing safety impairs the autonomous functioning of the robot. This problem implies the need for a broadened concept of product safety. Our comparative study shows that the institutional framing of the ASP as well as concrete solutions to this problem differs between Europe and Japan in two respects: (1) the understanding of robot agency and (2) the concept of “appropriate” user–robot interaction. (shrink)

The use of robotic technology in healthcare is increasing. The aim was to explore attitudes toward the use of humanoid robots in healthcare among patients, relatives, care professionals, school actors and other relevant actors in healthcare and to analyze the associations between participants’ background variables and attitudes. The data were collected through a cross-sectional survey (N = 264) in 2018 where participants met a humanoid robot. The survey was comprised of background variables and items from a modified Robot Attitude Scale. (...) Multiple linear regression analysis and Spearman’s Rho correlation were used to analyze associations between variables. Most of the participants were positive toward the use of humanoid robots in healthcare and only a few were negative. Attitudes toward the use of humanoid robots were more positive among other relevant actors, such as service personnel and politicians in healthcare, participants with a higher educational level and older adults. More research is needed on the reasons underlying negative attitudes because these might affect the introduction of humanoid robots in healthcare. A careful evaluation of appropriate first target groups as well as which tasks are appropriate for humanoid robots to perform in healthcare are needed. (shrink)

Technological progress may eventually produce sophisticated robots with human-like traits that result in humans forming meaningful relationships with them. Such relationships would likely lead to a demand for human–artificial intelligence matrimony. U.S. Supreme Court decisions that expanded the definition of marriage to include interracial and same-sex couples, as well as those that have not extended marriage to polygamous relationships, provide guidance regarding the criteria that human–AI would have to meet to successfully assert a right to marry. Ultimately, robots will have (...) to possess certain characteristics of personhood to marry, including the capacity to contract and to engage in an intimate relationship. Alternatively, if AIs can simulate these abilities sufficiently, we may believe that they have these capacities. Even if AIs genuinely possess the capabilities necessary to enter into a marriage, it is social acceptance of intelligent non-humans as life partners that will likely influence legal development is this realm rather than personhood criteria. However, AIs are likely to face bias due to their “artificial” rather than biological nature. Yet, Peter Singer’s influential argument regarding speciesism in the context of animal rights implies that AIs with specific human-like qualities cannot be justifiably denied certain rights. (shrink)

Much has been written about the need for trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI), but the underlying meaning of trust and trustworthiness can vary or be used in confusing ways. It is not always clear whether individuals are speaking of a technology’s trustworthiness, a developer’s trustworthiness, or simply of gaining the trust of users by any means. In sociotechnical circles, trustworthiness is often used as a proxy for ‘the good’, illustrating the moral heights to which technologies and developers ought to aspire, at (...) times with a multitude of diverse requirements; or at other times, no specification at all. In philosophical circles, there is doubt that the concept of trust should be applied at all to technologies rather than their human creators. Nevertheless, people continue to intuitively reason about trust in technologies in their everyday language. This qualitative study employed an empirical ethics methodology to address how developers and users define and construct requirements for trust throughout development and use, through a series of interviews. We found that different accounts of trust (rational, affective, credentialist, norms based, relational) served as the basis for individual granting of trust in technologies and operators. Ultimately, the most significant requirement for user trust and assessment of trustworthiness was the accountability of AI developers for the outputs of AI systems, hinging on the identification of accountable moral agents and perceived value alignment between the user and developer’s interests. (shrink)

This article reflects on securitization efforts with respect to ‘killer robots’, known more impartially as autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Our contribution focuses, theoretically and empirically, on the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a transnational advocacy network vigorously pushing for a pre-emptive ban on AWS. Marking exactly a decade of its activity, there is still no international regime formally banning, or even purposefully regulating, AWS. Our objective is to understand why the Campaign has not been able to advance its disarmament agenda (...) thus far, despite all the resources, means and support at its disposal. For achieving this objective, we challenge the popular assumption that strong stigmatization is the universally best strategy towards humanitarian disarmament. We investigate the consequences of two specifics present in AWS, which set them apart from processes and successes of the campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and laser-blinding weapons: the complexity of AWS as a distinct weapons category, and the subsequent circumvention of its complexity through the utilization of pop-culture, namely science fiction imagery. We particularly focus on two mechanisms through which such distortion has occurred: hybridization and grafting. These provide the conceptual basis and heuristic tools to unpack the paradox of over-securitization: success in broadening the stakeholder base in relation to the first mechanism and deepening the sense of insecurity in relation to the second one does not necessarily lead to the achievement of the desired prohibitory norm. In conclusion, we ask whether it is not the time for a more epistemically-oriented expert debate with a less ambitious, lowest common denominator strategy as the preferred model of arms control for such a complex weapons category. (shrink)

Bill Joy’s deep pessimism is now famous. Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, his defense of that pessimism, has been read by, it seems, everyone—and many of these readers, apparently, have been converted to the dark side, or rather more accurately, to the future-is-dark side. Fortunately (for us; unfortunately for Joy), the defense, at least the part of it that pertains to AI and robotics, fails. Ours may be a dark future, but we cannot know that on the basis of (...) Joy’s reasoning. On the other hand, we ought to fear a good deal more than fear itself: we ought to fear not robots, but what some of us may do with robots. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to explore the acceptance of social robots as companions. Understanding what affects the acceptance of humanoid companions may give society tools that will help people overcome loneliness throughout pandemics, such as COVID-19 and beyond. Based on regulatory focus theory, it is proposed that there is a relationship between goal-directed motivation and acceptance of robots as companions. The theory of regulatory focus posits that goal-directed behavior is regulated by two motivational systems—promotion and prevention. People with (...) a promotion focus are concerned about accomplishments, are sensitive to the presence and absence of positive outcomes (gains/non-gains), and have a strategic preference for eager means of goal-pursuit. People with a prevention focus are concerned about security and safety, are sensitive to the absence and presence of negative outcomes (non-losses/losses), and have a strategic preference for vigilant means. Two studies support the notion of a relationship between acceptance of robots as companions and regulatory focus. In Study 1, chronic promotion focus was associated with acceptance of robots, and this association was mediated by loneliness. The weaker the promotion focus, the stronger was the sense of loneliness, and thus the higher was the acceptance of the robots. In Study 2, a situationally induced regulatory focus moderated the association between acceptance of robots and COVID-19 perceived severity. The higher the perceived severity of the disease, the higher was the willingness to accept the robots, and the effect was stronger for an induced prevention (vs. promotion) focus. Models of acceptance of robots are presented. Implications for well-being are discussed. (shrink)

This article aims to present the problem of the impact of artificial intelligence on respect for human dignity in the sphere of care for people who, for various reasons, are described as particularly vulnerable, especially seniors and people with various disabilities. In recent years, various initiatives and works have been undertaken on the European scene to define the directions in which the development and use of artificial intelligence should go. According to the human-centric approach, artificial intelligence should be developed, used (...) and monitored with people in mind, their needs and rights. It is artificial intelligence that should adapt to the rules set by people, not the other way around. The source of all human rights and freedoms is respect for human dignity. This is evidenced by numerous European, international, national regulations and documents. Respecting this value is also one of the works on the AI development. One of the areas of our life into which AI enters more and more boldly and which in the near future, due to demographic reasons and aging population, may be almost dominated by modern technologies, is the medical and care system. The usefulness of industrial co-robots made us think about the possibility of using similar devices in the non-industrial sphere, including in the sphere of care, nursing and therapy. Actually, despite the impressive development of technology and AI, intelligent robots/devices used for care, nursing or therapy (so-called care/nursing or therapy robots) perform rather simple activities. They provide information, navigate, bring something and give it (e.g. medicines, food), help to get up. They are an important support for medical staff in this respect. Performing tasks that are more complex in terms of technology and movement, such as feeding, washing, intimate hygiene, dressing or undressing, is still beyond the reach of the currently used robots. The question we must ask ourselves is whether, in the future, care robots will be able to perform such tasks, and should they do so? Will this lead to the replacement of human medical personnel in the performance of the above-mentioned activities with such robots. Would anyone want to be "looked after" by a soulless machine? Should potential wards/patients, in other words all of us in fact, have the right to object to being taken into the care of an intelligent robot? There is no doubt that intelligent robots have great potential, especially when it comes to ensuring or maintaining the independence or mobility of people with various health limitations. However, we must not forget about the risks and dangers they may generate. Even a simple robot generates serious legal and ethical problems. Who should be liable for damage caused in connection with improper care performed with the participation of a robot? Robots based on AI systems are able to collect a significant amount of sensitive data, for example through the face and speech recognition function. There is considerable scope for abuse in this area, not only in terms of personal data protection but also in terms of informational self-determination, privacy and dignity. Bearing in mind the above risks, the creation of a new right to object to being looked after by a robot should be considered. (shrink)

When the social relevance of robotic applications is addressed today, the use of assistive technology in care settings is almost always the first example. So-called care robots are presented as a solution to the nursing crisis, despite doubts about their technological readiness and the lack of concrete usage scenarios in everyday nursing practice. We inquire into this interconnection of social robotics and care. We show how both are made available for each other in three arenas: innovation policy, care organization, and (...) robotic engineering. First, we analyze the discursive “logics” of care robotics within European innovation policy, second, we disclose how care robotics is encountering a historically grown conflict within health care organization, and third we show how care scenarios are being used in robotic engineering. From this diagnosis, we derive a threefold critique of robotics in healthcare, which calls attention to the politics, historicity, and social situatedness of care robotics in elderly care. (shrink)

Taking the term “companion” in a broad sense to include robot caregivers, playmates, assistive devices, and toys, we examine ethical issues that emerge from designing companion robots for children. We focus on the relative importance and potential ethical implications of creating robots with certain types of esthetic features. We include an examination of whether robots ought to be made to appear or act humanlike, and whether robots should be gendered. In our estimation, this line of ethical inquiry may even provide (...) insight into the nature and appropriateness of existing institutions and widely accepted interactions among human beings. (shrink)

In a recent letter, Dillion et. al (2023) make various suggestions regarding the idea of artificially intelligent systems, such as large language models, replacing human subjects in empirical moral psychology. We argue that human subjects are in various ways indispensable.

This paper shares results from a pedagogical experiment that assigns undergraduates to “cheat” on a final class essay by requiring their use of text-generating AI software. For this assignment, students harvested content from an installation of GPT-2, then wove that content into their final essay. At the end, students offered a “revealed” version of the essay as well as their own reflections on the experiment. In this assignment, students were specifically asked to confront the oncoming availability of AI as a (...) writing tool. What are the ethics of using AI this way? What counts as plagiarism? What are the conditions, if any, we should place on AI assistance for student writing? And how might working with AI change the way we think about writing, authenticity, and creativity? While students (and sometimes GPT-2) offered thoughtful reflections on these initial questions, actually composing with GPT-2 opened their perspectives more broadly on the ethics and practice of writing with AI. In this paper, I share how students experienced those issues, connect their insights to broader conversations in the humanities about writing and communication, and explain their relevance for the ethical use and evaluation of language models. (shrink)

The revolution of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly generative AI, and its implications for human–robot interaction (HRI) opened up the debate on crucial regulatory, business, societal, and ethical considerations. This paper explores essential issues from the anthropomorphic perspective, examining the complex interplay between humans and AI models in societal and corporate contexts. We provided a comprehensive review of existing literature on HRI, with a special emphasis on the impact of generative models such as ChatGPT. The scientometric study posits that due to (...) their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior, generative AIs like ChatGPT will continue to grow in popularity in pair with human rational empathy, tendency for personification and their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior. As they blur the boundaries between humans and robots, these models introduce fresh moral and philosophical dilemmas. Our research aims to extrapolate key trends and unique factors in HRI and to elucidate the technical aspects of generative AI that enhance its effectiveness in this field compared to traditional rule-based AI systems. We further discuss the challenges and limitations of applying generative AI in HRI, providing a future research agenda for AI optimization in diverse applications, including education, entertainment, and healthcare. (shrink)

The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not yet been sufficiently (...) explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society. (shrink)

Cultural influences are pervasive throughout human behaviour, and as human–robot interactions become more common, roboticists are increasingly focusing attention on how to build robots that are culturally competent and culturally sustainable. The current treatment of culture in robotics, however, is largely limited to the definition of culture as national culture. This is problematic for three reasons: it ignores subcultures, it loses specificity and hides the nuances in cultures, and it excludes refugees and stateless persons. We propose to shift the focus (...) of cultural robotics to redefine culture as an emergent phenomenon. We make use of three research programmes in the social and cognitive sciences to justify this definition. Consequently, cultural behaviour cannot be explicitly programmed into a robot, rather, a robot must be designed with the capability to participate in the interactions that lead to the arising of cultural behaviour. In the final part of the paper, we explore which capacities and abilities are the most salient for a robot to do this. (shrink)

In a friendly interdisciplinary debate, we interrogate from several vantage points the question of “personhood” in light of contemporary and near-future forms of social AI. David J. Gunkel approaches the matter from a philosophical and legal standpoint, while Jordan Wales offers reflections theological and psychological. Attending to metaphysical, moral, social, and legal understandings of personhood, we ask about the position of apparently personal artificial intelligences in our society and individual lives. Re-examining the “person” and questioning prominent construals of that category, (...) we hope to open new views upon urgent and much-discussed questions that, quite soon, may confront us in our daily lives. (shrink)

When asked about humanity’s future relationship with computers, Marvin Minsky famously replied “If we’re lucky, they might decide to keep us as pets”. A number of eminent authorities continue to argue that there is a real danger that “super-intelligent” machines will enslave—perhaps even destroy—humanity. One might think that it would swiftly follow that we should abandon the pursuit of AI. Instead, most of those who purport to be concerned about the existential threat posed by AI default to worrying about what (...) they call the “Friendly AI problem”. Roughly speaking this is the question of how we might ensure that the AI that will develop from the first AI that we create will remain sympathetic to humanity and continue to serve, or at least take account of, our interests. In this paper I draw on the “neo-republican” philosophy of Philip Pettit to argue that solving the Friendly AI problem would not change the fact that the advent of super-intelligent AI would be disastrous for humanity by virtue of rendering us the slaves of machines. A key insight of the republican tradition is that freedom requires equality of a certain sort, which is clearly lacking between pets and their owners. Benevolence is not enough. As long as AI has the power to interfere in humanity’s choices, and the capacity to do so without reference to our interests, then it will dominate us and thereby render us unfree. The pets of kind owners are still pets, which is not a status which humanity should embrace. If we really think that there is a risk that research on AI will lead to the emergence of a superintelligence, then we need to think again about the wisdom of researching AI at all. (shrink)

People meeting a robot for the first time do not know what it is capable of and therefore how to interact with it—what actions to produce, and how to produce them. Despite social robotics’ long-standing interest in the effects of robots’ appearance and conduct on users, and efforts to identify factors likely to improve human–robot interaction, little attention has been paid to how participants evaluate their robotic partner in the unfolding of actual interactions. This paper draws from qualitative analyses of (...) video-recorded interactions between a robot and groups of participants, in the framework of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. We analyse the particular ways in which participants shape their embodied actions, how they can reproduce a prior action that failed to obtain a response from the robot; and how they explore the robot’s embodied nature. We find a set of recurrent methods or practices, showing that robot-recipient design displays not only participants’ initial assumptions about the robot’s competences, but also more importantly perhaps their continuous assessment of the robot’s behaviour, and their attempts to adapt to it. Participants locally produce and constantly revise their understanding of the robot as a more or less competent co-participant, drawing from its past, current, and projected conduct and responsiveness. We discuss the implications of these findings for research in robotics and human–robot interactions, and the value of the approach to shed new light on old questions by paying attention to the quality of gesture and the sequential organisation of interaction. (shrink)

AI ethics is proposed, by the Big Tech companies which lead AI research and development, as the cure for diverse social problems posed by the commercialization of data-intensive technologies. It aims to reconcile capitalist AI production with ethics. However, AI ethics is itself now the subject of wide criticism; most notably, it is accused of being no more than “ethics washing” a cynical means of dissimulation for Big Tech, while it continues its business operations unchanged. This paper aims to critically (...) assess, and go beyond the ethics washing thesis. I argue that AI ethics is indeed ethics washing, but not only that. It has a more significant economic function for Big Tech. To make this argument I draw on the theory of intellectual monopoly capital. I argue that ethics washing is better understood as a subordinated innovation network: a dispersed network of contributors beyond Big Tech’s formal employment whose research is indirectly planned by Big Tech, which also appropriates its results. These results are not intended to render AI more ethical, but rather to advance the business processes of data-intensive capital. Because the parameters of AI ethics are indirectly set in advance by Big tech, the ostensible goal that AI ethics sets for itself—to resolve the contradiction between business and ethics—is in fact insoluble. I demonstrate this via an analysis of the latest trend in AI ethics: the operationalization of ethical principles. (shrink)

The article examines the problem of ensuring the political stability of a democratic social system with a shortage of a vital commodity (like vaccine against COVID-19). In such a system, members of society citizens assess the authorities. Thus, actions by the authorities to increase the supply of this commodity can contribute to citizens' approval and hence political stability. However, this supply is influenced by random factors, the actions of competitors, etc. Therefore, citizens do not have sufficient information about all the (...) possibilities of supplying, and it is difficult for them to make the right decisions. Such citizen unawareness can be exploited by unscrupulous politicians to achieve personal targets. Therefore, it is necessary to organize public control to motivate politicians to use all available opportunities in supplying. The goal of the paper is to build such a digital mechanism of public control of the politicians by citizens, which would best assess and stimulate the activities of the authorities to improve the supply of a vital commodity. In the age of artificial intelligence, such digital public control in the face of uncertainty can be based on digital machine learning. In addition, it is necessary to take into account and model the activities of politicians associated with the presence of their own targets that do not coincide with public ones. Such politicians can use the learning of citizens for their own targets. The objective of the article is to build an optimal digital mechanism of public control in a two-level model of a democratic social system—a digital society. At its top level, there is the Citizen, who gives an assessment for the Politico located at the lower level. In turn, the Politico can influence the supplying of a vital commodity. Political stability is guaranteed if the Citizen regularly approves of the Politico’s actions to increase this supply. However, the Politico may not use the opportunities available to him to offer a commodity to achieve a personal target. To avoid this, the Politico’s control mechanism is proposed. It includes the procedure for digital learning of the Citizen, as well as a procedure for assessing the Politico activity. Sufficient conditions have been found for the synthesis of such the Politico’s control mechanism, at which stochastic possibilities of increasing the supply of a vital commodity are used. The example of such the Politico’s control mechanism is considered on the case of supply of the COVID-19 vaccine in England. (shrink)

Although social robots are achieving increasing prominence as companions and carers, their status as partners in an interactive relationship with humans remains unclear. The present paper explores this issue, first, by considering why social robots cannot truly qualify as “Thous”, that is, as surrogate human partners, as they are often assumed to be, and then by briefly considering why it will not do to construe them as mere machines, slaves, or pets, as others have contended. Having concluded that none of (...) these familiar designations does justice to social robots’ still evolving and yet-to-be-defined status, I go on to consider whether engaging in a “relational turn” which prioritises the relationship over the entities in relation, can provide a more satisfactory alternative. In defending this stance, Damiano and Dumouchel contend that in addition to foregrounding the possibility that social robots constitute new types of artificial companions which we can find “companionable in different ways”, the relational turn has the added advantage of providing a more expansive and productive ethical framework for future research and development in this domain. But on balance, it is far from clear that this approach can circumvent the so-called “dummy-human” problem, the contention that social robots are little more than sophisticated toys with the potential to deceive their users about the prospects for genuine partnership and bonding. Accordingly, I conclude that while Damiano and Dumouchel’s shift in “target phenomenology” brings to the fore facets of the interaction that may be difficult to infer by focussing on the relata alone, it is ultimately too “thin” to qualify as a template for robust human-robotic interaction of the sort that could qualify as a genuine partnership. Hence, while their relational turn has its merits in alerting us to the novel possibilities and challenges afforded by this ever-evolving technology and to the limitations of existing frameworks, it is contended that in itself it cannot provide an adequate template for conceptualising what a genuine human–robot partnership might entail. Instead, we need a more expansive approach that can do greater justice to the complexities of human-robotic interaction in its continuities as well as differences from more familiar human prototypes. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has many times been suggested as a promising recipe for the construction of artificial moral agents due to its emphasis on moral character and learning. However, given the complex nature of the theory, hardly any work has de facto attempted to implement the core tenets of virtue ethics in moral machines. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate how virtue ethics can be taken all the way from theory to machine implementation. To achieve this goal, we (...) critically explore the possibilities and challenges for virtue ethics from a computational perspective. Drawing on previous conceptual and technical work, we outline a version of artificial virtue based on moral functionalism, connectionist bottom–up learning, and eudaimonic reward. We then describe how core features of the outlined theory can be interpreted in terms of functionality, which in turn informs the design of components necessary for virtuous cognition. Finally, we present a comprehensive framework for the technical development of artificial virtuous agents and discuss how they can be implemented in moral environments. (shrink)

Departing from popular imaginations around artificial intelligence (AI), this article engages in the I in the AI acronym but from perspectives outside of mathematics, computer science and machine learning. When intelligence is attended to here, it most often refers to narrow calculating tasks. This connotation to calculation provides AI an image of scientificity and objectivity, particularly attractive in societies with a pervasive desire for numbers. However, as is increasingly apparent today, when employed in more general areas of our messy socio-cultural (...) realities, AI- powered automated systems often fail or have unintended consequences. This article will contribute to this critique of AI by attending to Nicholas of Cusa and his treatment of intelligence. According to him, intelligence is equally dependent on an ability to handle the unknown as it unfolds in the present moment. This suggests that intelligence is organic which ties Cusa to more contemporary discussions in tech philosophy, neurology, evolutionary biology, and cognitive sciences in which it is argued that intelligence is dependent on having—and acting through—an organic body. Understanding intelligence as organic thus suggests an oxymoronic relationship to artificial. (shrink)

In the last few years, we have witnessed a surge in scholarly interest and scientific evidence of how algorithms can produce discriminatory outcomes, especially with regard to gender and race. However, the analysis of fairness and bias in AI, important for the debate of AI for social good, has paid insufficient attention to the category of age and older people. Ageing populations have been largely neglected during the turn to digitality and AI. In this article, the concept of AI ageism (...) is presented to make a theoretical contribution to how the understanding of inclusion and exclusion within the field of AI can be expanded to include the category of age. AI ageism can be defined as practices and ideologies operating within the field of AI, which exclude, discriminate, or neglect the interests, experiences, and needs of older population and can be manifested in five interconnected forms: (1) age biases in algorithms and datasets (technical level), (2) age stereotypes, prejudices and ideologies of actors in AI (individual level), (3) invisibility of old age in discourses on AI (discourse level), (4) discriminatory effects of use of AI technology on different age groups (group level), (5) exclusion as users of AI technology, services and products (user level). Additionally, the paper provides empirical illustrations of the way ageism operates in these five forms. (shrink)

Questions about robots feeling pain are important because the experience of pain implies sentience and the ability to suffer. Pain is not the same as nociception, a reflex response to an aversive stimulus. The experience of pain in others has to be inferred. Danaher’s (Sci Eng Ethics 26(4):2023–2049, 2020. ) ‘ethical behaviourist’ account claims that if a robot behaves in the same way as an animal that is recognised to have moral status, then its moral status should also be assumed. (...) Similarly, under a precautionary approach (Sebo in Harvard Rev Philos 25:51–70, 2018. ), entities from foetuses to plants and robots are given the benefit of the doubt and assumed to be sentient. However, there is a growing consensus about the scientific criteria used to indicate pain and the ability to suffer in animals (Birch in Anim Sentience, 2017. ; Sneddon et al. in Anim Behav 97:201–212, 2014. ). These include the presence of a central nervous system, changed behaviour in response to pain, and the effects of analgesic pain relief. Few of these criteria are met by robots, and there are risks to assuming that they are sentient and capable of suffering pain. Since robots lack nervous systems and living bodies there is little reason to believe that future robots capable of feeling pain could (or should) be developed. (shrink)