Philosophy 53 (203):51 - 69 (1978)

Abstract
A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false. What does this agreement consist in, if not in the fact that what is evidence in these language games speaks for our proposition?. The purpose of this paper is to outline a constructivist account of the notion of sense and to indicate why such an account is to be preferred to that given by classical semantics.
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100016302
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