The logic of the third man

Philosophical Review 80 (4):448-475 (1971)
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The main lines of interpretation offered to date of the Third Man Argument in Plato's Parmenides (132a1-b2) are considered and rejected. A new, set-theoretic, reconstruction of the argument is offered. It is concluded that the philosophical point of the argument is different from what it has been generally supposed to be: Plato is pointing out the logical shortcomings in his earlier formulated principle of One-Over-Many.



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S. Marc Cohen
University of Washington

Citations of this work

Abstract objects.Gideon Rosen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Aristotle on Ontological Dependence.Phil Corkum - 2008 - Phronesis 53 (1):65 - 92.
Aristotle on Mathematical Truth.Ph Corkum - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1057-1076.
Kantian Schemata: A Critique Consistent with the Critique.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Philosophical Investigations 41 (4):436-445.

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