Knowledge, speaker and subject

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):199–212 (2005)
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Abstract

I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.

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Citations of this work

Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
Knowledge claims and context: loose use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Motivated contextualism.David Henderson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.

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References found in this work

On the linguistic basis for contextualism.Jason Stanley - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.
Are Knowledge Claims Indexical?Wayne A. Davis - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257-281.

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