Epistemic closure filters for natural language inference

Abstract

Epistemic closure refers to the assumption that humans are able to recognize what entails or contradicts what they believe and know, or more accurately, that humans’ epistemic states are closed under logical inferences. Epistemic closure is part of a larger theory of mind ability, which is arguably crucial for downstream NLU tasks, such as inference, QA and conversation. In this project, we introduce a new automatically constructed natural language inference dataset that tests inferences related to epistemic closure. We test and further fine tune the model RoBERTa-large-mnli on the new dataset, with limited positive results.

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Michael Cohen
Tilburg University

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References found in this work

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Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 179.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (3):339.

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