Abstract

This chapter investigates whether, according to Aristotle, participation in judicial practices promotes the development of the moral, intellectual or civic virtues of the rhetorician or the audience. A close reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric reveals that Aristotle did not understand the art of rhetoric as having an inherently moral purpose. Rather, for Aristotle the art of rhetoric in a judicial setting implied an understanding of the available means of persuasion and entailed the ability of appealing to the emotions of the audience in order to win a lawsuit. For this purpose the rhetorician may arouse emotions that, in themselves, are morally questionable. Therefore, Aristotle emphasized the need for laws that govern the judicial process and prevent or curtail corrupting practices. Based on a reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the chapter takes issue with the participatory democracy approach, which traces its roots to Aristotle’s political thought, and presents the argument that political activity, including jury duty, necessarily constitutes an experience that promotes the moral or civic development of the citizen.