Aristotle's rhetoric and the cognition of being: Human emotions and the rational-irrational dialectic

Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 8 (1) (2004)
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Abstract

Within the second book of his Rhetoric, intent upon the art of persuasion, Aristotle sets forth the earliest known methodical explication of human emotions. This placement seems rather peculiar, given the importance of emotional dispositions in both Aristotle’s theory of moral virtues and in his moral psychology. One would expect to find a full account of the emotions in his extensive treatment of virtues as it appears in his ethical treatises, or as part of his psychological system in De Anima. In none of these places, however, does a systematic treatment of this part of Aristotle’s psychology emerge as it does in the Rhetoric. Such is a surprising, seemingly unusual phenomenon in consideration of Aristotle’s extreme care for and obsession with organization and categorization. Earnest analysis, however, reveals the intricate ingeniousness of Aristotle’s innovative project. Emotion, based upon the interplay between what Aristotle deems to be the ‘uniquely human’ rational and irrational parts of the human soul, involves Being and Being’s cognition of itself, and its dialectical encounter with the faculty of pure reason. Within this encounter is born human emotion. According to this formula, emotion is a phenomenon that is linked to concrete human existence while at the same time being fundamentally involved with cognition. Emotion bridges the gap between the this-worldliness of the human and his keen logic as a rational being. Such an understanding allows Aristotle to assert that emotional appeal, which often stands at the core of rhetoric, is not necessarily a way of tricking people or avoiding critical response, but can be used to persuade by bringing facts to people’s awareness. Through his novel rhetoric of emotion, Aristotle not only sheds light on the human condition, he brings rhetoric itself into the realm of the rational and the valid as a suitable means of human discourse.

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