Descartes’s First Meditation

International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):223-238 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Based on an earlier analysis that tries to show that existence is a real predicate, I now argue that Descartes’s dream and malicious demon arguments are fallacious. An object that stands external to me (i.e., that exists) is the one thing that I cannot produce by my dreams, and, on phenomenological grounds, I am immediately experiencing an existing object right now. Therefore, in accepting that it is a logical possibility that I am dreaming, either I illicitly conflate an existing object and an object of a dream, or Descartes’s claimthat there are never any sure signs by which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep is a presupposed but unfounded premise. Similarly, Descartes’s malicious demon argument must also be rejected.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Descartes' resolution of the dreaming doubt.Brad Chynoweth - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179.
The Ontological Status of Cartesian Natures.Lawrence Nolan - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):169–194.
Cartesian analyticity.Jesús A. Díaz - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):47-55.
Proofs for the Existence of God.Lawrence Nolan & Alan Nelson - 2006 - In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), The Blackwell to Descartes’ Meditations. Blackwell. pp. 104--121.
Descartes's Ontological Proof of God's Existence.Cecilia Wee - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (1):23-40.
Descartes’ Quartum Quid.Pedro Amaral - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:379-409.
The fourth meditation.Lex Newman - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):559-591.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-02

Downloads
58 (#248,189)

6 months
2 (#670,035)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references