Non-transitive looks & fallibilism

Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 200 (2010)
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Fallibilists about looks deny that the relation of looking the same as is non-transitive. Regarding familiar examples of coloured patches suggesting that such a relation is non-transitive, they argue that, in fact, indiscriminable adjacent patches may well look different, despite their perceptual indiscriminability: it’s just that we cannot notice the relevant differences in the chromatic appearances of such patches. In this paper, I present an argument that fallibilism about looks requires commitment to an empirically false consequence. To succeed in deflecting putative cases of non-transitivity, fallibilists would have to claim that there can’t be any perceptual limitations of any kind on human chromatic discrimination. But there are good reasons to think such limitations exist.



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Philippe Chuard
Southern Methodist University

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1951 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

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