Abstract

Informal coercive tactics play an important role in maintaining political and social order in authoritarian regimes today, a fact variously attributed to the state’s incapacity to monopolize coercive force and to the strategic concealment of repression from international society. Studying the coercive tactics used by the Chinese government, this article directs attention to how state institutions and strategies create incentives for state agents to delegate coercion to third parties. In particular, this article recognizes the importance of Chinese leaders’ traditional preference to rely on third parties rather than formal state force for social control, and also the impressive improvements in the institutionalization of state coercion after the start of extensive legal reforms in the late 1970s. More important, however, is the multilayered and decentralized state structure that creates tight constraints on local officials and therefore motivates them to use informal coercion. The state structure in China is conducive to informal coercion in two ways. First, when local officials pursue local or private interests that diverge from central interests, informal coercion helps them overcome procedural barriers and avoid scrutiny from above. Second, although central and other upper authorities tend to restrict local officials’ use of force, they often exert considerable pressure on local authorities to fulfill various tasks that require strong coercion. Such conflicting or unfunded mandates have frequently prompted the use of informal coercive tactics. This study highlights the difficulty of holding local government officials accountable with formal institutions in China.