Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal

Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579 (1997)
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Abstract

The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitive factors in emotion that need to be distinguished. A general representational metatheoretical framework for reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories is proposed. This is the Representational Theory of Emotion (RTE). A detailed case study of Antonio Damasio's important new contribution to emotion theory is presented in defense of the RTE. The paper is intended for readers interested in the foundations of emotion theory and cognitive science

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2009-01-28

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Louis C. Charland
PhD: University of Western Ontario

Citations of this work

The Natural Kind Status of Emotion.Louis C. Charland - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.
Theories of emotion causation: A review.Agnes Moors - 2009 - Cognition and Emotion 23 (4):625-662.
Shared Emotions and Joint Action.John Michael - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):355-373.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.

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