Abstract

The topic of the dissertation is the nature of the emotion produced by works of representational art, especially fiction. I begin by looking at theories of emotion in general in order to decide which is the best current theory, and the best current theory, I decide, is the cognitive theory. Under most versions of the cognitive theory, however, the apparent emotion produced by representational art cannot be counted as real, since the conditions under which it is produced do not satisfy the cognitive theory's belief condition. At this point, one can decide either to accept the cognitive theory as it stands and consequently deny that emotion produced by representational art is real, or once can choose to question whether the conditions laid down by the cognitive theory are too strong. I do the latter. ;In doing so, I follow the lead of Patricia Greenspan by considering three types of counterexamples: phobic cases, fantasy-based emotion, and altruistic emotion. I give most weight to fantasy-based emotion and altruistic emotion, taking them as offering convincing counterexamples to the belief condition of the cognitive theory. I then point out that fantasy and imagination is intimately involved in the representational arts, and I also point out that the most common emotions which are evoked by such art are altruistic or "other directed" emotions. Since I have argued that fantasy can produce real emotion, and that altruistic emotion towards imaginary individuals is possible, I can then argue that, contrary to what writers like Kendall Walton claim, most emotion before representational is real emotion. I then apply my findings to aesthetic evaluation