Abstract

The contemporary form of critical psychiatry and psychology focused on here follows Thomas Szasz in arguing that many of the concepts and practices of psychiatry are unscientific, value-laden, and epistemically violent. These claims are based on what I call the ‘comparativist’ critique, referred to as such since the argument relies on comparing psychiatry to what is taken to be a comparatively objective and useful somatic medicine. Here I adopt a Sedgwickian constructivist approach to illness and disability more generally to argue that the theoretical commitments of the comparativist critique are not just untenable, they are also epistemically harmful in much the same way criticals identify in psychiatry. This is because they commit to an unrealistic understanding of bodily health that reifies the ‘normal’ body in ways that are harmful for those who fall outside bodily, neurological, gendered, sexed, and racialized norms. Far from being a merely theoretical problem, I show how maintaining these commitments routinely contributes to the at least partial, and unintentional, marginalization of neurodivergent, disabled, and LGBTQI identity, agency, and history in critical psychiatry discourse and practice. I conclude that, although some of its critique of mainstream psychiatry is pertinent, the problems with Szaszianism’s core theoretical commitments are likely to be incompatible with critical psychiatry’s liberatory aims in the long run.