'Audi Alteram Partem’ but Why? On procedural equality and justice
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of the foundation of a procedural and minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing. This approach may be summarised in the ‘principle of adversary argument’ (the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard). In particular, I intend to test whether this principle may provide the bases for a conception of justice applicable to conflicts of value in politics. More precisely, the considerations I shall offer aim to answer the following question: ‘How should fair hearing (and in particular fair hearing qua listening to the other side) be construed and justified in order to provide the bases for addressing value conflicts justly?’. To this end, I contend that previous efforts to argue for the principle of adversary argument, especially those offered by Stuart Hampshire, have failed to provide genuinely universal and normatively cogent foundations for it. However, I submit that such foundations are nonetheless derivable from a basic idea of procedural equality which all participants in conflicts of value could be thought to endorse.